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"THE ETERNAL TRIANGLES OF THE LAW": 
TOWARD A THEORY OF PRIORITIES IN 
CONFLICTS INVOLVING REMOTE 
PARTIES 
Menachem Mautner* 
Here we meet the Eternal Triangle of the Law: an honest man (A), a 
rascal (B), and another honest man (C). Typically, the rascal imposes 
upon both of them ... and leaves to the law the problem of deciding 
which of them shall bear the loss. t 
The purchaser of entrusted or stolen goods faces a claim of title by 
the owner of the goods. A secured party discovers that a competing 
claim is made by another secured party with respect to his collateral. 
The holder of a document of title discovers that the goods covered by 
the document have been sold to another person. "Eternal triangles" 
are abundant in the law. 
The contexts vary;2 yet one thing is common: parties not in con-
tractual privity themselves assert simultaneous claims of rights over 
the same asset whose concurrent discharge is legally impossible, and 
the law is called upon to resolve the conflict.3 How should the law 
resolve such conflicts? No comprehensive theory has evolved to guide 
us in allocating rights in assets between competing claimants in such 
"triangle" situations.4 The object of this article is to take the first 
• Senior Lecturer, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law; Visiting Professor, Michigan Law 
School, 1988-1989, 1990-1991. LL.B. 1974, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law; LL.M. 1980, 
J.S.D. 1983, Yale Law School. - Ed. I would like to thank Lucian A. Bebchuk, Roger A. 
Cunningham, Meir Dan-Cohen, James F. Green, Samuel R. Gross, James E. Krier, Richard 0. 
Lempert, Mark Pieroni, Joseph Weiler, and James J. White for their comments and suggestions. 
1. A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TExT ON PROPERTY 179 (1950). 
2. "Query whether you have taken any course in this school which did not bring up some 
problems in priorities?" Edgar N. Durfee, Priorities, 51 MICH. L. REv. 459, 460 (1959). 
3. See also Edgar N. Durfee, Priorities: II, 51 MICH. L. REv. 685, 718 (1959) (discussing the 
pattern of priority conflicts). 
A complexity is sometimes added to a triangle situation when the original asset to which the 
claim of one party had related has subsequently been converted into another asset with respect to 
which the claim of the other party is being made. In such cases, an initial determination is 
necessary as to whether the first competing party would be allowed to trace its claim into the 
converted asset. On tracing, see 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrruTioN §§ 2.14-
2.18 (1978); Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated 
Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 172 (1983); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 98-108. 
4. See also Durfee, supra note 2, at 460 ("Even within particular fields, such as land law, one 
does not find a well-organized and systematic treatment of priorities."); cf. Thomas H. Jackson & 
Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 
95 
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steps in an attempt to formulate such a theory. 
Theoretically, from the perspective of the two competing parties, 
the question of how the law resolves priority conflicts should be of 
little importance: the parties would be content with any arbitrary pri-
ority criterion offered by the law for allocating the disputed asset be-
tween them, because the losing party under this rule would always 
enjoy the option of pursuing a contract or tort claim against the inter-
mediate wrongdoer. In a perfect world, by the end of these proceed-
ings, the situation of the two competing parties would be the same. In 
an imperfect world, however, in many cases a suit for contract or tort 
damages against the intermediate wrongdoer proves impractical, be-
cause that party has either absconded or is insolvent. Yet even where 
the intermediate wrongdoer is not judgment-proof, a damage claim 
against him is an unattractive option: the object of the controversy 
may be a unique asset; the proceedings may involve irrecoverable ex-
penses; the claimant may lose due to a judicial error; or if the claimant 
wins, he may still be undercompensated. Given these limitations, in-
herent in any damage claim and typical of damage claims against 
wrongdoers such as the intermediate parties dealt with above, the pri-
ority rule developed by the law should be of considerable importance 
to the competing parties. In many cases, the right of one of the two 
competing parties in the asset, as determined by the priority rule, is 
the only meaningful legal remedy available to the parties.5 Moreover, 
even if the priority rule offered by the law would not matter to the 
parties, the choice among possible priority rules could still matter 
from society's perspective: different priority rules might differently af-
fect and approximate varying policies that bear on the conduct of the 
parties and on the resolution of their conflict. 6 
Anglo-American priority law is premised on a doctrinal-deriva-
tional approach under which "triangle conflicts" are supposed to be 
resolved on the basis of the legal rights that the intermediate, wrong-
doing party could have transferred from the first-in-time competing 
party to the second-in-time competing party. In Part I, I outline the 
major propositions of this approach. I argue that in focusing on the 
1144 (1979) (stating that "the analytic justification for many of Article 9's most important prior-
ity rules remains obscure"). 
5. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT SCOOT, CoMMERCJAL TRANSACTIONS 488 (2d ed. 
1991); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of 
the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 190 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of 
Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1987); Thomas 
Jackson, Transfer Rules and the Resolution of Competing Ownership Claims, Discussion Paper 
No. 22, at 2-3 (Sept. 1986) (Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School). 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 9-36. 
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intermediate party, the doctrinal-derivational approach fails to ad-
dress the primary consideration relevant to resolving triangle conflicts, 
namely the conduct of the two remote claimants involved in the con-
flict. In Part II, I focus on the two remote parties involved in triangle 
conflicts. I offer two sets of prescriptions for resolving such conflicts, 
one founded on the goal of efficiency, the other on the goal of justice. I 
show, in turn, that the prescriptions these two normative concepts dic-
tate are basically similar. In Part III, I analyze the good faith pur-
chaser for value doctrine that stands at the core of Anglo-American 
priority law. I explore the extent to which this doctrine can be ration-
alized in light of the prescriptions suggested in Part II. I argue that, 
indeed, the doctrine can be rationalized in terms of both efficiency and 
justice. This, in turn, leads to the further general argument that the 
considerable success of legal economists in rationalizing vast portions 
of common law doctrine stems from the convergence that exists be-
tween the concept of efficiency and the concept of justice. In Parts IV-
VII, I analyze the rules governing four basic triangle conflicts: en-
trustments, conflicting transactions, seller-transferee conflicts, and 
theft. I explore the extent to which the rules governing these conflicts 
implement the prescriptions suggested in Part II. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL-DERIVATIONAL APPROACH 
At least three parties are involved any time a triangle conflict 
arises: a first-in-time claimant of rights in the asset (AJ, a second-in-
time claimant (CJ, and an intermediate wrongdoer (BJ who transacts 
with each of these two parties. Thus, in any triangle conflict C's rights 
in the asset derive from B, and, in turn, B's rights in the asset derive 
from A. One possible way to resolve the A-C conflict, therefore, is to 
hold that C's rights as against A would depend on the amount of legal 
rights that could have been transferred by B to C: given B's rights as 
against A. We may call this approach "the doctrinal-derivational ap-
proach." It has exerted a considerable influence on the evolution of 
our priority rules. 
The doctrinal-derivational approach is premised on two basic 
rules. The first is "nemo dat quod non habet" ("he who hath not can-
not give"). 7 Under this rule, C's rights in the disputed asset may never 
exceed those of B, as determined by B's transaction with A. The sec-
ond rule is the "shelter rule," which may be viewed as the positive 
counterpart of the nemo dat rule. Under the shelter rule, B may trans-
7. For a discussion of the nemo dat rule, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 7.10 n.1 (1965). 
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fer to C as many legal rights in the asset as B had acquired from A. 8 
The pivotal question, therefore, for resolving the A-C conflict 
under the doctrinal-derivational approach, is what degree of legal 
right in the disputed asset B owned by the time she transacted with C. 
In addressing this question, Anglo-American law recognizes three 
kinds of title that may vest in B as a result of her transaction with A. 
First, B's title in the asset may be classified as void title, her trans-
action with A giving B neither any legal rights in the disputed asset 
nor any legal powers with respect to the asset. In cases of this type, 
under the nemo dat rule, C's title in the asset would be classified as 
void title as well, so that in the A-C conflict, A would prevail over C. 
Second, B's title in the asset may be classified as valid title, B's 
transaction with A resulting in B's acquiring all legal rights and pow-
ers of A in the disputed asset. In cases of this type, A could make no 
claim for specific restitution of the disputed asset while, under the 
shelter rule, C's title in the asset, like B's title, would be classified as 
valid title. C would prevail, therefore, over A. 
Third, B's title in the asset may be classified as voidable title. B's 
title is voidable if B's transaction with A has initially vested B with 
valid title in the asset subject, however, to A's right subsequently to 
cancel his contract with B and to demand from B specific restitution of 
the disputed asset. In cases of this type, where A has canceled, the 
doctrinal-derivational approach deems B to have no rights in the asset 
as against A, but still to have the legal power to transfer valid title in 
the asset to C: provided C meets certain conditions. These conditions 
usually require that C qualify as "good faith purchaser for value" 
(GFPV). Thus, in cases in which B's title is classified as voidable title, 
A would prevail over C: unless C attains the status of GFPV, in which 
case C would prevail over A. In cases of voidable title, therefore, even 
though B has no rights in the asset as against A, B may still have the 
legal power to transfer valid title in the asset to C (a GFPV). 
The doctrinal-derivational approach seems intuitively appealing. 
At first sight, ii seems hard to deny the plausibility of the nemo dat 
rule and the shelter rule. The major flaw of this approach, however, is 
that it resolves the A-C conflict without explicitly and directly taking 
8. In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1131 
(1983); American Std. Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981); Dan 
Pilson Auto Ctr., Inc. v. DeMarco, 509 N.E.2d 159 (DI. App. Ct. 1987); Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 
A.2d 917 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); In re Hennessy, 494 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); U.C.C. 
§ 2-403(1) (1990) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had •••• "); 
JAMES J, WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 171 (3d ed. 1988); 
John F. Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing 
and Financing of Goods, 56 TExAs L. REV. 1147, 1154 (1978). 
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into account the conduct of the parties involved and the policies rele-
vant to that conduct. Rather, the major determinant under the doctri-
nal-derivational approach is the amount of legal rights and powers 
held by the intermediate wrongdoer, B, as a result of her transaction 
withA (i.e., whether B's title was void, valid, or voidable). Moreover, 
this determinative factor supposedly arises within the context of the A-
B transaction independently of the prospect that the disputed asset 
will eventually be transferred from B to C: so that the real conflict will 
involve A and C: rather than A and B. Obviously, a rational approach 
to the A-C conflict would view the conduct of these two competing 
parties and the policies pertaining to it as central to any resolution.9 It 
is the purpose of this article to elaborate such an approach. 
It should be noted, however, that in most cases in which A could 
demand reclamation of his asset from B, with whom A had transacted, 
the common law would classify B's title in the asset as voidable title, 
rather than as valid or void title. Io As I have noted earlier, in cases in 
which B's title is classified as voidable title, Anglo-American priority 
law resolves the A-C conflict by inquiring whether Chas managed to 
qualify as a GFPV. In introducing the GFPV concept, therefore, our 
law seems to shift its focus of inquiry, at least in part, to the competing 
parties themselves. We need to explore, therefore, the extent to which 
the GFPV concept may, indeed, serve as an appropriate doctrine for 
resolving conflicts involving remote parties. I I 
II. NORMATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS: EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE 
In what follows, I shall offer normative guidelines for resolving 
triangle conflicts that derive from the concepts of efficiency and jus-
tice. In contrast to the doctrinal-derivational approach, which focuses 
on B, the intermediate wrongdoer who links both A and C: the effi-
ciency and the justice approaches entirely ignore B. Rather, they both 
focus on the two remote parties involved in the conflict, A and C: 
viewing them as two parties pressing conflicting claims for legal pro-
tection of two conflicting interests. 
9. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 188-90, 199; LAW REFORM CoMM., TwELFTH REPORT, 
TRANSFER OF TITLE TO CHATIELS, §§ 6-7 (1966), reprinted in JOHN HONNOLD, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 412, 413-14 (5th ed. 1984). 
10. See infra Parts IV-VII. In discussing the GFPV concept, the authors of the Corpus Juris 
Secundum list 42 different legal contexts in which it serves to determine priority between com-
peting, remote parties. See 11 CJ.S. Bona Fide at 388-89 (1938). 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 77-108. 
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A. Efficiency 
Legal scholarship of the past two decades in the areas of contract 
law, tort law, and commercial law has been dominated by the writings 
of legal economists. These scholars have argued, normatively,12 that 
legal rules should promote the goal of allocative efficiency. As a nor-
mative concept, efficiency implies the maintenance of a certain ratio 
between means and ends, inputs and outputs, resources and outcomes. 
It mandates that the least amount of resources be invested for the at-
tainment of a given end. In so doing, it is a subset of what Weber 
called "formal rationality":13 the expedience of means to any given 
ends. 
Priority rules aspiring to promote the goal of efficiency in the con-
text of triangle conflicts would attempt to minimize three costs: first, 
the cost of preventing triangle conflicts; second, the losses resulting 
from such conflicts; third, the costs involved in resolving these con-
flicts. Efficiency-oriented priority rules would, therefore, be designed 
in the following manner: 
In cases in which one of the two competing parties could have 
clearly prevented the occurrence of the conflict ex ante by incurring 
expenses relatively smaller than the value of the interests at stake (e.g., 
by informing potential second-in-time competing parties of his claim 
to the asset or, having acquired knowledge of the existence of an ear-
lier conflicting claim, by avoiding a conflicting transaction), taking 
into account the probability of the occurrence of a conflict, priority 
should be accorded to the other party. 
In all other cases in which no party enjoys a clear advantage over 
the other in terms of the ability to prevent the conflict, priority should 
be granted to the party likely to suffer the greater loss ex post if he is 
denied priority and the other party prevails.14 Additionally, priority 
rules should be shaped in such a manner as to minimize the parties' 
resort to the court system and the administrative costs involved in 
12. Economic analysis of law has been divided into three parts: descriptive law and econom-
ics, concerned with the principle of economic efficiency as an explanatory tool of existing legal 
rules; positive law and economics, concerned with the capacity of economic models to provide a 
concept within which legal problems may be conceived; normative law and economics, con-
cerned with the evaluation of legal rules in terms of their economic efficiency and with the fash-
ioning of new legal rules in light of the efficiency criterion. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, 
Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 
221, 221-22 (1980); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REv. 509, 548-49 (1980). Most of the literature generated as part of the economic analysis of 
law scholarship has been descriptive and positive, rather than normative. 
13. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 35-43 (Controversies in Sociol-
ogy No. 16, 1984). 
14. See also SCHWARTZ & Scorr, supra note 5, at 22-23, 230-32. 
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litigation. is 
The above prescriptions closely resemble those suggested by legal 
economists who have advocated that our tort rules governing acci-
dents16 ought to promote the goal of efficiency.17 Those legal econo-
mists have suggested that tort rules governing accidents ought to 
promote three major policies. is 
First, they should promote the policy of guiding behavior so that 
individuals take efficient ex ante measures for risk reduction and for 
accident prevention. Under this policy, whenever one of the parties to 
an accident possesses a greater ability to prevent the occurrence of an 
accident, liability for the accident should be imposed on that party if 
his avoidance costs would have been lower than the accident's ex-
pected losses. 
Second, the rules should promote the ex post policy of minimizing 
the losses suffered by accident victims. Under this policy, tort liability 
15. The literature that has attempted to offer solutions to priority conflicts in triangle situa· 
tions has confined itself, almost without exception, to the above ex ante consideration. See, e.g., 
SCHWARTZ & Scon, supra note 5, at 488-91; Harold R. Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and 
the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1980); Jackson, supra note 5. These attempts 
have usually endeavored to identify one of the two competing parties as the party better situated 
to avoid the conflict. In doing so, these attempts have usually disregarded the relevance of the 
first above-mentioned ex post consideration to some cases of conflict, and the relevance of the 
second above-mentioned ex post consideration to all cases of conflict. In this article, I shall 
employ all three considerations for evaluating both the content and the structure of the priority 
rules that have evolved in our system for resolving triangle conflicts. 
16. A basic distinction exists in tort law between accidents and intentional harms: whereas 
in accident cases injuries are the result of the conducts of two or more parties that are mutually 
irreconcilable, in intentional harm cases one party deliberately inflicts a harm upon another. 
Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 391-94 (1975). 
17. Normative tort law scholarship of the past two decades has been dominated by two major 
approaches. First, the economic approach whose foundations have been laid down by Guido 
Calabresi in his seminal The Costs of Accidents. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CoST OF ACCIDENTS 
(1970). Second, the corrective justice approach, advocated by such scholars as Richard Epstein, 
George Fletcher, and Jules Coleman. See Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: 
A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Causation]; Richard 
A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 
(1974); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Nuisance Law]; Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of 
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein, supra note 16; George P. Fletcher, Fair-
ness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. RE.v. 537 (1972); Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice 
and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 423, 426 (1982) [hereinafter Coleman, Corrective 
Justice]; Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. RE.v. 259 
(1976) [hereinafter Coleman, Strict Liability]. For other expressions of the corrective justice 
approach, see Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I, 1 LAW 
& PHIL. 371, 372-76 (1982); Joseph M. Steiner, Putting Fault Back into Products Liability: A 
Modest Reconstruction of Tort Theory, 1 LAW & PHIL. 419, 422-23 (1982). 
18. C.G. VEUANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW AND EcONOMICS 71 (1982); Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. RE.v. 1089, 1093-105 (1972); Itzak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical 
Appraisal of Modem American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33-56 (1980); Joseph M. 
Steiner, Economics, Morality, and the Law of Torts, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 227, 229-39 (1976). 
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rules should be designed so that the losses caused by accidents are 
distributed between the parties in such a manner as to minimize their 
adverse consequences. 
Third, the rules should promote the ex post policy of minimizing 
the costs of administering the system of accident law. Under this pol-
icy, tort liability rules should be designed to minimize the costs in-
volved in determining the rights and liabilities that result from 
accidents. 
The resemblance between the efficiency imperatives relating to tri-
angle conflicts and those relating to tort accidents is not incidental. 
Triangle conflicts may well be viewed as accidents, 19 while accidents 
may be viewed as events involving priority conflicts.20 
19. See STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONOMIC .ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) (defining ac-
cidents as "harmful outcomes that neither injurers nor victims wished to occur - although 
either might have affected the likelihood or severity of the outcomes"); VEUANOVSKI, supra note 
18, at 71 (describing an accident as a cost-imposing event); Steiner, supra note 18, at 227 (Acci-
dents occur "whenever the practitioners of two activities simultaneously attempt to use the same 
resource ••• under conditions where only one can do so successfully, and thus to the detriment of 
the other."). 
20. Tort law governs the relationships of foreigners, i.e., parties who have not established 
contractual privity to regulate their relationship. It determines the interests that are supposed to 
be protected by the law against injurious interference by foreigners and the contexts in which this 
protection would be accorded. 1 FOWLER v. HARPER ET AL., THE LA w OF TORTS lv-lxi (2d ed. 
1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIIE LAW OF TORTS 6, 16 (5th ed. 
1984); see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1090, 1100-01 (asserting that the function 
of the legal system in general is to allocate entitlements between conflicting claimants). By so 
doing, tort law mediates between claims for the protection of conflicting interests: whenever it 
determines that a certain interest deserves legal protection in a certain context, it also determines 
that another, competing interest does not deserve such protection. Thus, tort law is a priority 
law par excellence. 
I argued that normative tort law scholarship of the last two decades has been dominated by 
the economic approach and by the corrective justice approach. See supra note 17. Out of these 
two approaches, the only one relevant to the issues raised by the conflicts discussed in this article 
is the economic approach. The corrective justice approach is premised on the assumption that 
the legal system establishes a well-defined set of interests and contexts in which interests are 
protected (so that the role of tort law is to remedy the condition of those who suffer harm to a 
protected interest of theirs). Coleman, Corrective Justice, supra note 17, at 423, 426, 429-36; 
Coleman, Strict Liability, supra note 17, at 263, 267; Epstein, Causation, supra note 17, at 479-80, 
489, 501; Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 17, at 49-53; Fletcher, supra note 17, at 543, 546, 
550; Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 715-22 (1983); Steiner, supra note 18, at 227-28, 248, 250-51. In con-
trast, the economic approach is premised on the assumption that even though the interests that 
are supposed to be protected by the system are generally known, the interests that will be pro-
tected by the law in particular cases of accident cannot be known in advance. Rather, these 
interests are supposed to be determined by the system by applying the guidelines offered by this 
approach. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 328 (1990); Susan R. 
Rose-Ackerman, The Simple Economics of Tort Law: An Organizing Framework, 2 EUR. J. POL. 
EcoN. 91, 96-97 (1986); see also Englard, supra note 18, at 54 (arguing that Posner's tort theory 
is not concerned with the plaintiff's quest for redress but with the efficient allocation of society's 
resources). It is this feature of the economic approach that makes it so relevant and attractive for 
serving as a normative guideline for resolving the conflicts discussed in this article: the question 
raised in each of these conflicts is which of two mutually irreconcilable interests deserves protec-
tion by the law, i.e., in what contexts should the interests of one competing party be protected 
and in what contexts should those of the other party. It is with respect to these questions that 
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B. Justice 
The concept of justice is relevant for the conflicts discussed in this 
article because, at least in part, it presupposes a world of scarce re-
sources in which people are pressing conflicting claims for the protec-
tion of competing interests. One of the functions of a theory of justice 
is to offer normative criteria for arbitrating between such conflicting 
claims.21 
The concept of justice is widely held to be comprised of three ma-
jor types: retributive justice, concerned with criteria for the punish-
ment of wrongdoers; corrective justice, concerned with the protection 
of entitlements from injury or appropriation;22 and distributive justice, 
concerned with the distribution of scarce resources to competing 
claimants on the basis of criteria such as equality, desert, or need.23 
The essence of the concept of retributive justice is that wrongdoers 
deserve to be punished for (and in proportion to) their wrongdoings.24 
Though retributive justice has been most commonly invoked to justify 
punishments inflicted by the state mechanism on criminal offenders, it 
can be (and, indeed, has been) used in other contexts as well. Thus, 
retribution has sometimes been invoked to justify the imposition of 
the corrective justice approach cannot offer normative guidelines whereas the economic approach 
can. 
21. AlusTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 177-79, 186-87 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1955); 
BRIAN BARRY, 'l'HEoRIES OF JumcE (1989); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CoNCERNING THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, sec. 3, pt. 1 (1751), reprinted in 4 DAVID HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
WORKS 179-87 (1752, 1957); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JumcE 4, 10, 281 (1971); Stanley I. 
Benn, Justice, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 298 (1967). 
22. Corrective justice does not seem to be relevant to the conflicts discussed in this article. 
This concept presupposes the existence of a well-defined system of entitlements, yet we should 
assume such a system is missing when we resign ourselves to the task of constructing systems of 
priority rules for resolving triangle conflicts. Thus, the concept of corrective justice is irrelevant 
for the resolution of triangle conflicts for the same reasons that make the corrective justice ap-
proach of contemporary normative tort scholarship irrelevant to such conflicts. See supra note 
20. 
23. Benn, supra note 21. Different writers have put forward different criteria for distributing 
scarce resources. For a review of the literature, see JoHN R. LUCAS, ON JumcE 164-65 (1980). 
24. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§§ 6.3, 6.6 (1978); H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 1-27, 210-37 (1968); K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits 
Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 138 (Harry B. Acton ed., 1969); K.E. Baier, ls 
Punishment Retributive?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra. at 130; John Hospers, 
Punishment, Protection and Retaliation, in JumcE AND PUNISHMENT 21 (Jerry I. Cederblom II 
& William Blizek III eds., 1977); Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Pun-
ishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (1980); Richard Wasserstrom, Some Problems with Theories of 
Punishment, in JumcE AND PUNISHMENT, supra. at 173. Retribution is often presented as a 
subcategory of desert, rather than as an independent category of justice considerations. See, e.g., 
GEORGE SHER, DESERT 69-90 (1987); Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in NOMOS VI 
69, 80-85 (Carl J. Friedrich & John W. Chapman eds., 1963). 
Usually for the concept of retribution to apply the conduct of an actor should be intrinsically 
immoral, but the concept is sometimes applied to cases involving morally neutral, yet wrongful, 
conduct as well. See FLETCHER, supra; Wasserstrom, supra. 
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liability on tortfeasors to compensate their victims,25 to rationalize the 
allocation of entitlements under the Uniform Commercial Code,26 and 
to justify differential treatment within the family circle.27 Retribution, 
therefore, can be a criterion in the resolution of priority conflicts such 
as those discussed in this article. A party who fails to take precaution-
ary measures for the prevention of a possible conflict fails to show 
respect for the autonomy of a potential competing party.28 A party 
forced to lose an interest as a result of a triangle conflict is forced to 
bear adverse consequences not chosen by him. From a retributivist 
perspective, therefore, whenever one of the parties to a conflict can 
easily prevent the occurrence of the conflict but fails to do so, priority 
should be accorded to the other competing party, so that the party 
who fails to take measures appropriate for prevention will bear the 
losses resulting from the conflict. Obviously, this imperative resem-
bles, to a great extent, the ex ante policy derived from the concept of 
efficiency. 29 
25. For discussion see 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 20, § 12.1, at 108 n.10, 4 Id. § 25.1, at 
490-97; SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 76. 
26. David M. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228 (1982). 
27. HART, supra note 24, at 3 ("it would be dogmatic to deny the names of punishment or 
property to the similar though more rudimentary rule-regulated practices within groups such as 
a family, or a school, or in customary societies whose customs may lack some of the standard or 
salient features oflaw"); Wasserstrom, supra note 24, at 173, 175 ("I see no reason to believe that 
the case of legal punishment is any more the paradigm of punishment than is, for example, the 
case of parental punishment. ..• I see no reason to focus upon the law rather than the school, the 
family, or a voluntary association as the standard or central setting for punishment."). 
28. The retributivist theory of Herbert Morris seems particularly suitable to cases of retribu-
tion within the context of contract and commercial law. In Herbert Morris, Persons and Punish-
ment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968), reprinted in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 40 (Jeffrie 
G. Murphy ed., 1973), Morris presents the criminal law as a body of rules designed to define for 
each person a sphere that is immune from interference, thus requiring individuals to assume the 
burden of the exercise of self-restraint. A person who fails to exercise the required self-restraint 
renounces a burden that others have assumed and thus gains an advantage over them. Punish-
ment of those who violate the rules is therefore justified for three reasons. 
First, it is only reasonable that those who voluntarily comply with the rules be provided 
some assurance that they will not be assuming burdens which others are unprepared to 
assume .•.. Second, fairness dictates that a system in which benefits and burdens are equally 
distributed have a mechanism designed to prevent a maldistribution in the benefits and bur-
dens .... 
Third • . • • [P]unishing ... restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking 
from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt. 
Id. at 42-43. For discussion of Morris' suggestions see FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 6.3; SHER, 
supra note 24, at 53-58; Wasserstrom, supra note 24, at 173, 191-94. It seems that the force of 
Wasserstrom's criticism of Morris' theory is of lesser relevance when the theory is applied to 
cases of retribution in contract law (as opposed to the hard core norms of criminal law). See also 
Phillips, supra note 26, at 251 (discussing "the moral tenet that it is selfish for one to engage in 
conduct that does not allow for the exercise of equivalent conduct by others"); id. at 254 ("[T]he 
negligent actor has subjected others to risk, thereby showing disrespect for them. His conduct 
further shows a lack of cooperativeness. The degree of freedom that the negligent actor allows 
himself is such that, if enjoyed by others, would prevent society from functioning efficiently.''). 
29. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20. Landes and Posner come close to this argu-
ment when they say: "An avoidable injury - implying social waste - might be perceived as 
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As I noted earlier, distributive justice concerns the distribution of 
scarce resources between competing claimants. Out of the various 
possible distributive criteria that might be used under this concept, the 
one most relevant for resolving triangle conflicts is the need 
criterion. 3o 
The concept of needs has been neglected by philosophers, while 
liberal economists have denied its separate existence outside of the 
concept of preferences.31 It is usually invoked to justify social and 
humanitapan programs to assure individuals a certain level of mini-
mal welfare that they would not have been able to reach otherwise. 32 
Yet the core idea of the concept of needs may be generalized to imply 
that scarce resources should be allocated to avoid excessive hardship 
and suffering,33 i.e., to parties who would undergo a great amount of 
suffering if they were deprived of such resources. 34 Within the context 
wrongful and therefore arouse indignation and desire for retribution for which tort remedies are 
a surrogate. This would illustrate a merging of fairness and efficiency, retributive and deterrent, 
tort theories." WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 14 (1987); see also Phillips, supra note 26, at 251-53, 255-61 (culpability considera-
tions and loss avoidance considerations as leading to the same allocation of entitlements); Gary 
T. Schwartz, Contn'butory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 699-
703 (1978) (the convergence between the economic concept of negligence and the concept of 
moral fault). 
30. The criterion of desert mandates that individuals enjoy benefits and suffer detriments 
according to their autonomous decisions. See BRIAN BARRY, PoLlTICAL ARGUMENT 108-09 
(1965); LUCAS, supra note 23, at 202; SHER, supra note 24; Feinberg, supra note 24; James 
Rachels, What People Deserve, in JusncE AND EcoNOMIC DISTRIBUTION 150 (John Arthur & 
William H. Shaw eds., 1978); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 752 (1984). Usually, in triangle conflict cases, both competing parties find themselves in-
volved in the conflict following their own voluntarY actions. The criterion of desert, in itself, 
therefore, is too indeterminate for resolving such conflicts. As to the criterion of equality, a 
condition for treating the two competing parties equally for the purpose of resolving their conflict 
is that no distinction between them, based on some relevant consideration, be discerned. As I 
argued earlier, however, sometimes considerations of retribution suggest bases for treating the 
parties to a conflict differently, and, as I shall argue below, considerations of need also might 
serve as ground for according them different treatment. Moreover, action according to the equal-
ity criterion will raise further questions such as whether to let the two competing parties enjoy 
equal opportunity to appropriate the disputed asset (flipping a coin? inviting bids?) or, alterna-
tively, to effect the sale of the asset to a third party and then apportion the proceeds between the 
competing parties (equally? pro-rata to the parties' losses?). 
31. DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS 1-24 (1987). 
32. Id.; CHAIM PERELMAN, JusncE, LAW, ANDARGUMENT4, 16-17 (1980); RAWLS, supra 
note 21, at 276-77; NICHOLAS REsCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JusncE 75-76 (1966); Charles Fried, 
Distributive Justice, 1 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 45 (1983); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The 
Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1976); M.H. Lessnoff, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Justice, in JusncE AND EcONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, supra note 30, at 
139; H.J. McCloskey, Human Needs, Rights and Political Values, 13 AM. PHIL. Q. 1 (1976); 
Shalom Schwartz, The Justice of Need and the Activation of Humanitarian Norms, 31 J. Soc. 
ISSUES, Summer 1975, at 111. 
33. "Needs are ... linked to hardship and suffering, which it is surely part of the first busi-
ness of ethical theory to understand, as it is the first business of ethics to prevent." 
BRAYBROOKE, supra note 31, at 8. 
34. On the relation between need and utilitarianism, see id. at 161-86. 
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of priority conflicts such as the ones discussed in this article, the need 
criterion would mandate giving priority to that competing party likely 
to suffer the greater loss if the other party prevails.35 Obviously, this 
imperative resembles, to a great extent, the first ex post policy derived 
from the concept of efficiency.3 6 
Two criteria of justice suggest themselves as particularly relevant 
for the resolution of triangle conflicts: retribution and need. Consid-
erations of retributive justice mandate that priority over a disputed 
asset be denied to a competing party who could have take11 measures 
to prevent the conflict, but failed to do so. Need considerations man-
date granting priority to that competing party likely to suffer the 
greater loss as a result of the conflict, if the other party prevails. Obvi-
ously, these two considerations resemble, respectively, the ex ante and 
ex post imperatives derived from the concept of efficiency. 
C. Structuring Priority Rules 
Having derived our normative prescriptions, the next question we 
35. Theoretically, in applying the need criterion, the overall utility situation of the two par-
ties involved in the conflict should be taken into account. But the law never operates in such a 
way. Rather, it always confines the information relevant for the allocation of the entitlement 
under a rule to that which bears on the policies embodied in the rule. Thus, for example, it might 
be argued that, in contract law, the doctrine of supervening contingencies, the rule that specific 
performance is denied if it entails unreasonable hardship to the party in breach, and the substan· 
tial performance rule all involve redistribution of at least some of the expectation interest of 
injured promisees to breaching promisors for the sake of protecting the promisors from excessive 
losses. In none of these cases, however, is the overall utility situation of the two parties taken 
into account in determining whether to apply the rule to their contractual relation or not. (This, 
in turn, may result in redistribution of resources from a poor promisee to a rich promisor, merely 
because in the narrow context in which the rule is applied the rich person is likely to suffer a 
considerable harm.) 
36. See supra text accompanying note 14. The debate over the relationship between justice 
and utilitarianism, and over the relationship between rights theories and utilitarianism, is a class-
ical one in the history of moral philosophy involving, among others, such figures as Hume, Mill, 
and Sidgwick. See HUME, supra note 21; JOHN s. MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM 
AND OTHER EssAYS 272 (Alan Ryan ed., 1987); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OP Enucs 
264-94, 423-59 (7th ed. 1907). For contemporary discussion of this topic, see BRUCE A. ACKER· 
MAN, PRlvATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNSTITUTION 71-87 (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S 
EMPIRE 276-312 (1986); RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OP REASON 75-165 
(1988); R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OP CoN· 
SEQUENTIALISM (1982); UTILITY AND RIGlITS (R.G. Frey ed., 1984); BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
MORAL LUCK 71-82 (1981); Alan Gewirth, Can Utilitarianism Justify Any Moral Rights?, In 
NoMos XXIV 158 (J. Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1982); Kent Greenawalt, Utilita-
rian Justifications for the Observance of Legal Rights, in NoMos XXIV, supra, at 139; R.M. Hare, 
Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 23 (Amartya Sen & Ber-
nard Williams eds., 1982) [hereinafter Hare, Ethical Theory]; Hare, Utility and Rights: Comment 
on David Lyons's Essay, in NOMOS XXIV, supra, at 148; Lyons, Mill's Theory of Justice, in 
v ALUES AND MORALS 1 (Alvin I. Goldman & Jaegwon Kim eds., 1978); David Lyons, Utility 
and Rights, in NOMOS XXIV, supra, at 107; Philip Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: 
Reflections on Ackerman's Private Property and the Constitution, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 44 (1979); 
Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 12 HARv. J.L. & Pun, POLY. 611 (1989); Charles Taylor, 
The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra, at 129. 
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face is how fact-specific we want the application of our priority rules 
to be. Two possible methods of application (which resemble the cur-
rent tort law distinction between the standard of negligence and "strict 
liability" rules) suggest themselves: a case-by-case method and a "typ-
ical situations" method. 
Under a case-by-case method, our priority rules would be defined 
only by the above goals of efficiency or justice. This would mean that 
in every particular case of conflict we would have to consider whether 
one of the two competing parties had enjoyed a clear advantage over 
the other in terms of the ability to prevent the occurrence of the con-
flict, and, if not, which of the two competing parties would be likely to 
suffer the greater loss if the other party prevails. 
In contrast, under a typical situations method, we would endeavor 
to identify typical situations about which we could tell, with a high 
degree of certainty, that members of one of the two categories of com-
peting parties involved in the conflict are better located to avoid the 
occurrence of the conflict than members of the other category.37 Our 
priority rule would then provide that in all cases in which a certain 
conflict arises in circumstances such as those envisioned by the rule, 
members of the other category of competing parties would prevail. 
Additionally, we would endeavor to identify typical situations about 
which we could tell, with a high degree of certainty, that members of 
one of the two categories of competing parties to a conflict are likely to 
suffer the greater loss if members of the other category prevail. Our 
priority rule would then provide that, in all cases in which a conflict 
arises in circumstances such as those envisioned by the rule, members 
of the former category of competing parties would prevail. (We shall 
apply this rule whenever we are unable to apply the first rule.) 
Obviously, the ex post efficiency policy of minimizing the costs in-
volved in resolving priority rules dictates that we opt for typical situa-
tions rules rather than for case-by-case rules.38 Indeed, I shall argue 
that the priority rules that have evolved in our law are typical situa-
tions rules: they are not comprised of standards for determining prior-
ity conflicts according to unique facts of each particular conflict. 
Instead, these rules are designed to resolve priority conflicts by identi-
37. On the similar facet of strict liability rules, see Guido Calabresi & Jon Hirschoff, Toward 
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055; Phillips, supra note 26, at 232, 233, 261-63; 
Posner, supra note 24, at 90-91. 
38. See supra note 37; see also Epstein, supra note 5, at 13-15. For a similar argument on the 
relation between typical situations rules and case-by-case rules, see SCHWARTZ & Scoo-r, supra 
note 5, at 490-91, 516-17; Richard Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisa~ 18 J.L. & 
EcoN. 293, 300 (1975); Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infonnation and the Law of 
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-18 (1978). 
108 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:9S 
fying situations in which members of certain categories of competing 
parties will most often deserve priority. 
In the foregoing discussion I have approached the issue of the 
structure of priority rules from the perspective of the ex post efficiency 
policy of minimizing the costs involved in the administration of claims 
resulting from conflicts and accidents. This perspective is undoubt-
edly relevant for the priority rules discussed in this article, for it is 
inherent in these rules that (much like the rules governing tort acci-
dents) they allocate a loss to one of the parties involved in these con-
flicts. Priority rules are loss allocation rules. But there is an 
important difference between tort accidents and triangle conflicts: ac-
cidents result in a loss; triangle conflicts result in both a loss to one 
party and a gain to the other. Priority rules for triangle conflicts are, 
therefore, not only loss allocation rules, but also rules for determining 
entitlements in disputed assets. The question is in what way this addi-
tional facet of priority rules bears on the issue of their structure. 
In tort accident cases, allocative efficiency requires the minimiza-
tion of the three costs identified earlier in this article (the costs of 
preventing accidents; the losses due to accidents; the costs of adminis-
tering accident law).39 While these costs are relevant to triangle con-
flicts as well, such conflicts raise an additional concern of allocative 
efficiency: that resources (e.g., disputed assets) be put to their best pro-
ductive use. 40 There is no way for the legal system to design its prior-
ity rules to accommodate this additional efficiency concern in each 
individual case of conflict. But the system can, at least indirectly, fa-
cilitate the allocation of disputed assets in a manner accommodating 
this additional efficiency concern. 
It has been argued that when the transaction costs involved in an 
exchange transaction are low, a legal system pursuing the goal of allo-
cative efficiency will tend to adopt rules that afford little discretion in 
determining entitlements. The combination of low transaction costs 
and low entitlement-determination costs will maximize the extent to 
which conflicts between competing parties will be resolved by market 
39. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20. 
40. A.NraoNY KRoNMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF CoNTRACT LAW 1-2 
(1979); RICHARD POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-11, 30-33, 67, 79 (3d ed. 1986); 
SCHWARTZ & Scorr, supra note 5, at 25; VEUANOVSKI, supra note 18, at 54; Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 18, at 1093-94; Jules L. Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical 
Review of the Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649, 658-59 (1984); 
Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 17, at 77; Gjerdingen, supra note 20, at 722-28; Frank 
Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
431, 434, 435 (1980). 
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transactions, rather than by resort to the court system.41 
If parties involved in a triangle conflict wish to enter a transaction 
for the transfer of the entitlements determined by the system's priority 
rules, such an exchange will involve low transaction costs: once the 
conflict erupts, the parties know each other; the number of the parties 
is small (usually two); and the relationship between the parties is dis-
crete ("one shot").42 In short, the conditions for minimal transaction 
costs are present. Therefore, a system interested in minimizing the 
parties' resort to the court system and in encouraging, instead, further 
transactions between them will provide the parties with the other req-
uisite for easy market transactions: simple, mechanical rules of prior-
ity that will unequivocally determine their entitlements and that will 
serve as a baseline for further negotiation between them. 43 By doing 
so, the system will promote efficiency both by putting resources (enti-
tlements in disputed assets) to their best productive use and by mini-
mizing the parties' resort to the system. Thus, from these perspectives 
as well, typical situations priority rules seem preferable to case-by-case 
rules. 
Ill. THE GOOD FAITH PURCHASER FOR VALUE AND ITS 
OFFSPRING 
I have argued44 that in most cases in which a person A, who has 
transferred an asset under a contract, is entitled to demand specific 
restitution of the asset, the common law classifies the title of the per-
son holding the asset B as voidable title. I have also argued that if B 
further transfers the asset to a third party C: our priority law provides 
that C would prevail over the first-in-time claimant A if C is a "good 
faith purchaser for value" (GFPV). Appearing in one version or an-
other in the various conflicts involving remote parties over rights in 
the same asset, the GFPV is that pivotal figure of Anglo-American 
priority law who is capable of defeating a prior, prima facie preferred 
claim to rights in an asset. 
For the purposes of the various conflicts discussed in this article 
41. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Detennining Property Rights, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14, 25-26 (1985). 
42. Id. at 21-22; KRoNMAN & POSNER, supra note 40, at 6 n.6; POSNER, supra note 40, at 
106; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1096-97; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Exter-
nalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Ap-
proaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4, 9-10, 42 (1979). 
43. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking. 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257 (1974); Thomas Jackson, Embodiment of Rights in Goods and the Concept of Chattel 
Paper, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1051, 1073 (1983). 
44. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
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we must be familiar with three versions of the GFPV concept: the 
traditional GFPV concept, the GFPV concept of the Uniform Com-
mei:cial Code (UCC), and the buyer in the ordinary course of business 
(BOCB) concept of the UCC. The latter two concepts may be viewed 
as somewhat diluted versions of the traditional GFPV concept.45 
A. The Traditional Concept of Good Faith Purchase for Value 
Under the traditional rules of equity, for a party to qualify as a 
GFPV, that party should both provide value for the right purchased 
and acquire title in the right, without having notice of the existence of 
an adverse claim with respect to the right. 
1. Value 
a. Actual, new value. Value, for the purpose of acquiring the sta-
tus of GFPV, means present value, i.e., the actual transfer of resources 
(payment of money, transfer of property, rendering a service).46 Value 
.should be distinguished from both consideration and past considera-
tion. Consideration, the mere promise of future performance (the typ-
ical consideration sufficient to uphold a contractual promise under 
Anglo-American contract law in the past 200 years), and past consid-
eration, i.e., a debt antecedently owed to the purchaser (excluded from 
the contractual concept of consideration with the advent of the con-
cept of bargained-for consideration in the second half of the nineteenth 
century), would not be regarded as the rendering of value on the part 
of the purchaser for the purpose of attaining the status of GFPV.47 
45. The other major concept that is closely related to the GFPV concept is the concept of the 
holder in due course applicable in priority conflicts involving negotiable instruments. See U.C.C. 
§§ 3-302, 3-306 (1990). 
46. REsTATEMENT OF REsrmmON § 173 (1937); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TRUSTS 
§ 298 (1959); ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10, at 783 (1984); 
PALMER, supra note 3, §§ 16.5, 16.8; 3 AU5TIN w. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 298 (3d ed. 
1967); HERBERT T. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1300 (3d ed. 1939); Durfee, supra note 2, at 
489-90. 
47. The problem of balancing the rights of the two competing parties arises because usually 
the disputed asset is indivisible. In contrast, money is the most divisible asset. Therefore, in 
cases of dispute over a negotiable instrument, the law solves this problem by recognizing the 
possibility of a partial holder'in due course: in cases in which C: the holder of a negotiable 
instrument, qualifies as a holder in due course only to the extent of part of the value rendered by 
her for the instrument, C would be entitled to cut off A's defense to that extent while, with regard 
to the balance of the instrument's amount, A would be able to defeat C's claim. On consideration 
within the context of the GFPV doctrine, see REsTATEMENT OF REsrmmoN § 173 (1937); 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 302 (1959); CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, 
§ 11.10, at 783; ScOIT, supra note 46, §§ 297A, 302, 475.1. On past consideration within the 
context of the GFPV doctrine, see REsTATEMENT OF REsrmmoN § 173 (1937); REsTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§§ 304, 305 (1959); CUNNINGHAM ET AL, supra note 46, § 11.10, at 
785-86; PALMER, supra note 3, § 16.5; Scorr, supra note 46, §§ 304, 475; Durfee, supra note 2, 
at 489-90. 
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Thus, value in this context is not only "actual value," but also "new 
value." 
b. Adequate value. As is well known, under the contractual doc-
trine of consideration, courts are not supposed to inquire whether the 
consideration given by a promisee in exchange for a promise has been 
adequate. This is not the case, however, with respect to the value 
needed for qualifying as GFPV. Although the purchaser will be 
treated as having parted with value even when the worth of that value 
is lower than that of the right purchased in exchange, a major differ-
ence in worth between the two may be treated as evidence of bad faith 
on the part of the purchaser and, thus, disqualify her from the status 
ofGFPV.48 
c. Full value. Where the value of the right purchased approxi-
mates the value the purchaser rendered for it, the issue may still arise 
whether, in order to attain the status of GFPV, the purchaser has to 
part with all of the value promised by him. This issue has not been 
settled: "While there are statements that only full payment constitutes 
value, the issue must be regarded as in doubt when substantial pay-
ments have been made."49 Thus, for the purchaser to qualify as 
GFPV, he needs to part with at least a substantial amount of the value 
promised by him. 
2. Good Faith 
The good faith requirement for GFPV status relates to the state of 
mind of the purchaser at the time she enters into her contract and 
until she both renders value for the right and acquires title in it. 
Under the good faith requirement, the purchaser should not possess 
either of two states of mind. First, the purchaser should not act with 
actual knowledge that her transaction conflicts with the rights in, or 
claim to, the asset of some prior party. Second, in cases in which the 
purchaser lacks actual knowledge of the existence· of a prior right or 
claim, she should not hold any suspicion as to this possibility.50 How-
48. See REsTATEMENT OF REsrrnmoN § 173 (1937); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS§ 298 (1959); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 17.10 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); 
CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 11.10, at 783; Scarr, supra note 46, §§ 289, 298.4; Dur-
fee, supra note 2, at 491. 
49. PALMER, supra note 3, § 16.5, at 486; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 303 (1959); REsTATEMENT OF REsrrnmoN § 173 (1937); CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 
46, § 11.10, at 783; Scorr, supra note 46, § 302. 
50. See REsTATEMENT OF REsTrnmON § 174 (1937); REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS§ 297 (1959); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 48 § 17.11; CUNNINGHAM 
ET AL., supra note 46, § 11.10, at 787, § 11.15, at 833; Scorr, supra note 46, §§ 288, 297, 476; E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 670-71 (1963). 
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ever, whereas the standard for measuring actual knowledge is a subjec-
tive standard (the actual state of the purchaser's mind), the standard 
for measuring lack of suspicion is objective. Whenever the circum-
stances that surround the transaction are such that a reasonable per-
son in the position of the purchaser would have suspected that a prior 
conflicting right or claim exists, the purchaser would be deemed to 
have acted in bad faith, even if it is clear that she has actually acted 
without suspicion. It should be noted, however, that the required lack 
of suspicion does not amount to, and is distinct from, a due care and 
reasonable diligence requirement: the purchaser may qualify as 
GFPV even if she has acted negligently in failing to discover the exist-
ence of a prior conflicting claimant.st 
3. Combination of Value, Good Faith, and Acquisition of Title 
For a purchaser to attain the status of GFPV under the traditional 
GFPV doctrine he should acquire title in the right for the purchase of 
which he has transacted; this requirement is in addition to the former 
two requirements of value and good faith. Moreover, the purchaser 
needs both to render value for the right, and to acquire title in the 
right, while being in good faith. If, at any time before the purchaser 
both renders value for the right and acquires title in it, he actually 
becomes aware that a conflicting claimant exists, or the circumstances 
become such as should reasonably excite suspicion in his mind that 
such a claimant exists, the purchaser will not qualify as a GFPv.s2 
This means that the purchaser will not be entitled to the benefit of his 
bargain (Le., the purchaser may suffer expectation and reliance 
losses).s3 But will the purchaser lose the value rendered by him for the 
purchase of the asset before he received notice of the existence of the 
prior claimant (i.e., will the purchaser suffer restitution losses)? The 
traditional GFPV doctrine balances the interests of the purchaser and 
the prior claimant in several ways. Usually, the purchaser C will be 
entitled to reimbursement by the prior (prevailing) claimant A for the 
part of the purchase price that the purchaser has paid, s4 or to a lien 
upon the disputed asset to the extent of that payment. ss But the 
courts have, at times, employed other methods for balancing the inter-
51. Epstein, supra note 5, at 16; Farnsworth, supra note 50, at 670-71; 77 C.J.S. Sales§ 288 
(1952). 
52. REs'l'ATEMENT OF REsrrruTION §§ 173, 175 (1937); REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS§§ 299-302, 310, 311 (1959); ScOTI, supra note 46, §§ 299-303, 310, 311, 477; TIFFANY, 
supra note 46, § 1300. 
53. REs'l'ATEMENT OF REsrrruTlON § 173 cmt. i (1937). 
54. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 303; SCOTI, supra note 46, § 303. 
55. REsTATEMENT OF REsrrruTioN § 173 cmt. i (1937); Scorr, supra note 46, § 303. 
October 1991] Eternal Triangles 113 
ests of the parties. s6 
B. The Concept of Good Faith Purchase for Value Under the UCC 
Under the UCC, in the case of some of the conflicts discussed in 
this article, a purchaser of goods C may prevail over a prior claimant 
of a right in the same goods A if the purchaser is a GFPV.57 
Although there is some doubt about it, it seems that there is no 
difference in the content of the good faith requirement under the 
GFPV concept of the Code and under the traditional GFPV con-
cept. 58 The Code clearly deviates, however, from the traditional con-
cept in the way it defines the "value" that has to be rendered by the 
GFPV. Under the Code, "value" is "generally ... any consideration 
sufficient to support a simple contract,"59 as well as "a pre-existing 
claim" of the purchaser. 60 Thus, under the Code, "value" encom-
passes not only the actual transfer of resources, but also consideration 
and past consideration in the contractual sense. This means that, 
under the Code, a purchaser who has entered a binding contract and 
who has not yet parted with any actual value, or who has parted with 
actual value in the past, would qualify as a GFPV. 
56. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, at 795-96; ScO'IT, supra note 46, § 303. 
57. See infra Parts IV-VII. 
58. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990) provides: " 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction concerned." For the purposes of article 2 of the Code, however, " '[g]ood faith' in 
the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards affair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1990). It is not clear, however, to what 
extent the objective requirement of "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade" is meant to apply within the context of the GFPV concept; it seems that the 
drafters have intended to apply it as a standard to measure the conduct of merchants in perform-
ing their contractual obligations. Many courts, in line with the traditional GFPV concept, have 
applied the "subjective" test ofU.C.C. § 1-201(19). See Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. v. Dal 
Intl. Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986); Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Natl. Bank, 
612 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 779 (1981); Graves Motors, Inc. v. Docar Sales, 
Inc., 414 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. La. 1976); Frank Davies Buick AMCJeep, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 
432 So. 2d 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Dick Hatfield Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bob Watson Motors, Inc., 
708 P.2d 494 (Kan. 1985); United Road Mach. Co. v. Jasper, 568 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978); Karibian v. Paletta, 332 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Simon v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 
378 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Civ. Ct. 1975); Treit v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 335 (Or. 1972); Liles 
Bros. & Son v. Wright, 638 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. 1982). Others, however, have resorted to the 
"objective" test ofU.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) in resolving triangle conflicts. See Collingwood Grain, 
Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984); Brumley 
Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1983); Stowers v. Mahon (In re 
Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wathen's 
Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.) 32 B.R. 912 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); Hollywood 
Natl. Bank v. IDM Corp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1974); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Market 
Motors, Inc., 498 A.2d 571 (D.C. App. 1985). See also SCHWARTZ & Scorr, supra note 5, at 
498-99, 649-50; Farnsworth, supra note 50, at 670-71. 
59. u.c.c. § 1-201(44)(d) (1990). 
60. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b) (1990). See Werhan v. Pinellas Seafood Co., 404 So. 2d 570 (Ala. 
1981). A narrower concept of value is used by the Code for the purpose of the holder in due 
course doctrine of article 3. See U.C.C. § 3-303 (1990). 
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Under the traditional GFPV concept, the purchaser needs to ac-
quire title in the right she purchased. It is not clear whether under the 
GFPV concept of the Code the purchaser needs to acquire title in the 
goods: the Code does not provide any clue as to its approach to this 
issue and the case law is scarce. Theoretically, four major approaches 
suggest themselves: the purchaser may qualify as a GFPV upon the 
formation of her contract; the purchaser should acquire title in the 
goods;61 the purchaser should take possession in the goods;62 or the 
goods should be identified to the contract of the purchaser and her 
seller. 63 {Under each of these four approaches the purchaser should 
still be in good faith by the time she acquires the prescribed interest in 
the goods.) 
C. The Concept of Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business 
Under the UCC 
Under the UCC, in the case of some of the conflicts discussed in 
this article, a purchaser of goods C needs to qualify as BOCB for him 
to prevail over a competing prior claimant A. 64 The BOCB concept65 
is a variant of the traditional GFPV concept: it is comprised of the 
elements of good faith, value, the purchase transaction's being a sales 
transaction, and the identity of the seller as a merchant. 
As in the case of the Code's concept of GFPV, although there is 
some doubt about it, it seems that there is no difference between the 
content of the good faith requirement under the BOCB concept of the 
Code and under the traditional GFPV concept.66 Just as with the 
Code's concept of value sufficient to protect a GFPV, however, the 
Code deviates from the traditional GFPV concept in defining value for 
the purposes of the BOCB concept. Under the Code, "buying" in-
cludes the taking of goods "for cash or by exchange of another prop-
61. Under the Code, parties to sales transactions enjoy freedom of contract in determining 
the point in their transaction in which title is supposed to pass. In the absence of such determi-
nation, "title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his perform-
ance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods." U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1990). 
62. Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1982), revd., 462 U.S. 406 
(1983). 
63. u.c.c. § 2-501 (1990). 
64. See infra Parts IV-VII. 
65. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990); see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(a) (1990). 
66. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 1-201(19), 1-201(25) (1990). But see SCHWARTZ & Scorr, supra 
note 5, at 649-50; Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 
271 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1972) (an "objective" approach to the good faith requirement for the pur-
poses of the BOCB concept); Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258-59 (App. Div. 1979), ajfd., 
421 N.E.2d 500 (1981) (same); Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400, 404-05 
(Civ. Ct. 1967). 
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erty,'' as well as the taking of goods "on ... credit ... 67 Thus, value in 
this context includes not only the actual transfer of resources, but also 
consideration in the contractual sense. It does not include, however, 
the taking of goods in satisfaction of a preexisting debt. 6s 
The Code's requirements for BOCB status differ from its require-
ments for GFPV status in a number of other respects as well. Unlike 
both the traditional and the Code's concepts of GFPV, buying in the 
ordinary course of business under the Code is limited to the purchas-
ing of goods under a sales contract. It does not include cases in which 
goods are taken as collateral under a security agreement, 69 nor does it 
include cases in which the purchaser is a lessee.70 In addition, the 
traditional as well as the Code concept of GFPV applies to transac-
tions between a purchaser C and any seller B of a right in an asset. 
The Code's concept of BOCB, however, applies only to sales transac-
tions entered into between a purchaser and a merchant, i.e., "a person 
in the business of selling goods of that kind."71 
As noted earlier, 72 under the traditional GFPV concept, the pur-
chaser can qualify as GFPV only if he acquires title in the disputed 
asset (for value while still being in good faith). The definition of the 
term BOCB in the Code provides no explicit guidance as to the Code's 
approach to the title issue. Nor does the Code provide any clue as to 
whether a BOCB needs to take possession in the goods. Theoretically, 
a buyer might be viewed as having achieved the status of BOCB at 
four possible stages, and each of these approaches has found some sup-
port in the courts: the date of the formation of his contract; 73 the date 
the goods are identified to the contract of the buyer and his seller; 74 
67. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990); see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(a) (1990). 
68. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990) ("'Buying' ••. does not include a transfer ..• in total or partial 
satisfaction of a money debt."); see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(a) (1990). 
69. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990) ("'Buying' ••. does not include a transfer •.. as security for 
.•• a money debt."); see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(a) (1990). 
70. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 2-106(1) (1990). But see the definition of the term "'lessee in ordi-
nary course of business'" in§ 2A-103(1)(o) of the Code. 
71. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990); see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(a) (1990). 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
73. General Blee. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (Jn re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 B.R. 370, 377-78 
(Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., 46 B.R. 458, 463-64 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 580 P.2d 8 (Ariz. 1978); Interna-
tional Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 211 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); 
Wilson v. M & W Gear, 442 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Herman v. First Farmers State 
Bank, 392 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 
533-34 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
74. Maremont Corp. v. Hoesch Am., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Mich. 1987), affd., 852 
F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1988); Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams, 185 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Big 
Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 487 A.2d 953, 958-59 (Pa. Super. 
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the date the buyer takes possession of the goods; 75 and the date the 
buyer acquires title in the goods.76 (Under each of these four ap-
proaches the buyer should still be in good faith by the time he acquires 
the prescribed interest in the goods.) 
D. Rationalizing the Good Faith Purchase for Value Concept 
1. Good Faith 
As noted earlier, under both the traditional concept of GFPV and 
the Code's concepts of GFPV and BOCB, the purchaser C cannot pre-
vail over the prior claimant A where the purchaser acts with actual 
knowledge of the conflicting claim of the prior claimant, or where the 
circumstances are such that a reasonable person in the purchaser's po-
sition would have suspected that a prior claimant exists. 77 
The good faith requirement embodies the ex ante efficiency policy 
and the retributive justice considerations under which, whenever one 
of the two competing parties enjoys a clear advantage over the other in 
terms of the ability to prevent the occurrence of the conflict, that party 
should be denied priority. Clearly, whenever the purchaser acts with 
actual knowledge or presumed suspicion of the existence of a prior 
conflicting claim, the purchaser is the party best located to prevent the 
conflict by avoiding the transaction. 7s 
1985); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142 (R.I. 1983); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht 
Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842 (R.I. 1979); Daniel v. Bank of Hayward, 425 N.W.2d 416 (Wis. 1988). 
75. This was the approach of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA), which preceded the 
UCC. It defined a " '[b]uyer in the ordinary course of trade' " as "a person to whom goods are 
sold and delivered for new value and who acts in good faith and without knowledge •••• " UNIP. 
TRusr RECEIPTS Acr § 1 (1933, superseded by the UCC in 1951). Gilmore writes that "[s]ince 
the 'buyer in ordinary course' definition in the Code so closely follows the comparable definition 
in UTRA, it would be reasonable to assume that the omission of the delivery requirement was 
deliberate." 2 GILMORE, supra note 7 § 26.6 (1965). United States v. Wyoming Natl. Bank, 505 
F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidwell Indus., Inc., 565 P.2d 
868, 870- 71 (Ariz. 1977); First Natl. Bank v. Smoker, 286 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); 
see also Dolan, supra note 8, at 1159; Hal M. Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 39, 59-61 (1969); William D. War-
ren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 
469, 473 (1963). 
76. United Carolina Bank v. Sistrunk, 279 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Chrysler Corp. v. 
Adamatic, Inc., 208 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. 1973); see also John F. Dolan, The U.CC Framework: 
Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U. L. REv. 811, 853 (1979); Dolan, supra 
note 8, at 1156, 1159. 
A caveat is in order, however. Although cases interpreting "buyer in ordinary course" may 
arise under U.C.C. §§ 2-403 and 9-307, most cases have arisen under § 9-307. White and Sum-
mers note, however, that "those provisions essentially deal with similar policy issues - the cut-
ting off of third party property interests by purchasers - so that judicial glosses on the definition 
generally apply irrespective of whether the case arose under Article Nine or Two." WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 178. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 66. 
78. The denial of protection by the law to a party who knowingly enters a situation that 
might endanger an interest of his is a pattern recurring in numerous contexts in the law. Four 
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We should ask, however, why, under the good faith requirement, 
the purchaser has been absolved from the standard of care of negli-
gence and, instead, has been subordinated to the much narrower stan-
dard of lack of actual knowledge and presumed suspicion. If, by 
exercising reasonable precaution, the purchaser could have discovered 
the existence of the prior competing claimant, why have a priority rule 
in favor of a purchaser who has failed to take such measures? 
A possible answer to this question is that generally purchasers of 
assets or rights in assets are unable to take any meaningful precaution-
ary measures to verify whether a prior conflicting claimant exists. The 
only meaningful way potential purchasers can prevent triangle con-
flicts is by interviewing past owners of the assets they intend to 
purchase to verify that no conflicting claims exist. But obviously, this 
procedure is unreasonable under any cost-benefit test and, besides, the 
question arises: How far in the past should the purchaser inquire? It 
is, therefore, the assumption of our law that, as a general rule, pur-
chasers, as a class, cannot do much to prevent triangle conflicts. 79 The 
option is always there, however, for a first-in-time competing party to 
prove actual knowledge or presumed suspicion on the part of a partic-
ular purchaser and, in doing so, to deny that purchaser's priority.80 
striking examples include first, the "assumption of risk" doctrine of tort law, under which the 
claim of a plaintiff against a negligent defendant is supposed to be rejected if the plaintiff has 
knowingly and willfully exposed herself to the dangerous conduct of the defendant, see KEETON 
ET AL, supra note 20, § 68; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 37, at 1062, 1065, 1073; second, 
the "last clear chance" rule of tort law, under which in a contributory negligence regime the 
claim of a negligent plaintiff would be upheld if the defendant has had the last clear chance to 
avoid the accident, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 66; third, under the REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964), the regular strict liability rule against manufacturers of 
defective products would not apply whenever the ultimate user uses a defective product with 
knowledge of the defect; and finally, under U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1990), an improperly located 
financing statement would be effective against a party knowledgeable of the contents of the fi-
nancing statement. The good faith requirement that is part of the traditional GFPV concept and 
of the Code's concepts of GFPV and BOCB reflects policies similar to those embodied in the 
foregoing examples. See also Epstein, supra note 5, at 16-17; Kronman, supra note 38, at 6-9. 
79. See also Epstein, supra note 5, at 15 ("[I]mposing any affirmative duties on the purchaser 
is subject to the same, probably fatal, flaw as the basic negligence rule. There is simply no clear 
standard of how much care is reasonable under the circumstances ..•. "). 
80. Sometimes, however, a potential purchaser can take relatively little effort and identify the 
flaw in his transferor's title. A good example of this is Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. 
Div. 1979), ajfd., 421 N.E.2d 500 (1981). Porter, the owner of an Utrillo, lent it to one von 
Maker, to help him decide whether to buy it. Von Maker made known to Feigen, an art dealer, 
that the Utrillo was available for sale. One Wertz, von Maker's confederate, appeared at the 
Feigen gallery with the painting and sold it to Feigen for $20,000. At trial, Feigen testified that 
he was told that Wertz was an art dealer. In fact, Wertz was a delicatessen employee and the 
Feigen gallery could have learned this had it called either of the telephone numbers Wertz had 
given to it. Moreover, the gallery had a book on Utrillo that listed the owner of the painting at 
issue in 1969, just four years before it transacted to purchase the painting, but the gallery failed 
to use it. The court held that Feigen lacked good faith because it purchased without making 
inquiries. In cases of this type, ex ante efficiency considerations and considerations of retribution 
may mandate that the standard of negligence be applied to measure the conduct of the purchaser. 
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2. Value and Acquisition of Title 
a. Market value losses and personal value losses. The requirements 
of value and acquisition of title under the traditional GFPV concept 
can be rationalized as addressing both the ex post efficiency policy and 
the need consideration of minimizing the losses suffered by parties 
who compete over rights in the same asset. 
Let us assume that in our attempt to resolve a certain kind of con-
flict we are unable to apply ex ante efficiency and retributive justice 
considerations to the conduct of the competing parties. This means 
that the disputed asset must be allocated on the basis of ex post effi-
ciency considerations and "need" considerations, i.e., allocated to that 
competing party who is likely to suffer the greater loss if the other 
party prevails. 81 But how can we determine whether in a given con-
flict it is the first-in-time party A or the subsequent purchaser C who is 
likely to be the greater loss sufferer? Again, if we were to resolve tri-
angle conflicts by a case-by-case method, we would be able to assess 
the losses likely to be suffered by the parties in each particular case, 
and be able to allocate disputed assets accordingly. But what if (be-
cause of the need to minimize the costs of resolving such conflicts) we 
opt against a case-by-case method? In that case, in each of the typical 
categories of conflict ( entrustment, conflicting transactions, and so 
on), we must identify typical situations about which we can say, with a 
high degree of certainty, that one of the two competing parties in-
volved in that conflict is likely to suffer the greater loss. 82 Thus, we 
must identify the typical losses likely to be suffered by competing par-
ties and then allocate disputed assets to those parties whose losses 
would presumably be the greatest. 
Two distinctions might prove helpful to that process. The first, 
offered in an important article by Professor Margaret Jane Radin,83 is 
between ''personal property" and ''fungible property." Objects are 
personal property if their owners feel that the objects 
are almost part of themselves. These objects are closely bound up with 
personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as 
continuing personal entities in the world ...• [A]n object is closely re-
lated to one's personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved 
by the object's replacement. 84 
In contrast, an object is fungible property if it is held "for purely in-
strumental reasons," so that it "is perfectly replaceable with other 
81. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43. 
83. Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
84. Id. at 959. 
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goods of·equal market value."85 Thus, "if a wedding ring is stolen 
from a jeweler, insurance proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a 
wedding ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the price of a replacement 
will not restore the status quo - perhaps no amount of money can do 
so."86 Money, an automobile in the hands of a dealer, land in the 
hands of a developer, or an apartment in the hands of a commercial 
landlord are all additional examples of fungible property.87 A person's 
own car, house, or land are more likely to be personal property. 
The second distinction is between cases in which an owner of an 
asset willfully parts with it and cases in which an owner is deprived of 
an asset against her will 
Using these two distinctions, we may say that whenever an owner 
A of an asset that is fungible property willfully parts with it in a sales 
transaction, the owner's loss if the buyer B fails to pay the price would 
equal the contract price of the asset, which, presumably, will approxi-
mate the market value of the asset. The fact that the asset has been a 
fungible property asset at the disposal of ~its owner implies that the 
owner's loss would amount to the market value of the asset, and that 
the owner would suffer no loss of personal value. A similar loss would 
be suffered by the owner A of a fungible property asset who is deprived 
of her asset against her will. In this case, again, the fungible nature of 
the asset would exclude any element of personal value loss, in excess of 
the market value of the asset. Likewise, an individual A who willfully 
parts with a personal property asset in a sales transaction would lose 
the contract price of the asset which, presumably, will resemble the 
market value of the asset, if the buyer B defaults. This owner as well 
will avoid personal value losses, because all of the a8set's value to the 
owner presumably would be reflected in the contract price. 
In contrast, in cases in which the owner A of a personal property 
85. Id. at 960. 
86. Id. at 959. 
87. Id. at 960; Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote that 
[t]he only gift is a portion of thyself •••. Therefore, the poet brings his poem; •.. the girl, a 
handkerchief of her own sewing. This is right and pleasing, for it restores society in so far to 
its primary basis, when a man's biography is conveyed in his gift . . . . But it is a cold, 
lifeless business when you go to the shops to buy me something, which does not represent 
your life and talent, but a goldsmith's. 
RALPH W. EMERSON, Gifts, in EssAYS 305, 306 (Vintage Books 1990) (1847); see also STANLEY 
FlsHER ET AL., INTRooucnoN TO MICROECONOMICS 112 (2d ed. 1988) ("[C]onsumer's surplus 
••. is the difference between the maximum amount a consumer would pay for the quantity of 
that good he or she demands and the actual amount paid."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforce-
ment Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 554, 570-74 (1977) (the ex-
pected cost of establishing true losses resulting from breach of contract will induce promisees 
who attach idiosyncratic value to the performance promised them to negotiate liquidated dam-
ages clauses). 
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asset is deprived· of it against his will, the owner's loss might exceed 
the market value of the asset. This loss would be comprised of (a) a 
loss equal to the market value of the asset and (b) an additional loss, 
not reflected in the market value of the asset, i.e., a personal value loss 
representing the "personhood" element in the owner's title. 
The foregoing analysis is captured in the following fourfold table: 
TYPE OF TRANSACTION 




Market Value Loss 
Market Value Loss 
b. Value and title as "equalizers. " 
1. The traditional GFPV concept. 
Unwillful 
Market Value Loss 
Market Value Loss+ 
Personal Value Loss 
The ex post efficiency policy and the need consideration of mini-
mizing the losses of parties involved in triangle conflicts mandate that 
disputed assets be allocated to a second-in-time competing party C 
only if his losses at least equal the losses likely to be suffered by the 
first-in-time competing party A involved in the conflict. This means 
that, for any type of loss that might be suffered by a first-in-time com-
peting party, we would need to identify an equalizer, i.e., an 
equivalent, offsetting type of loss that the second-in-time competing 
party might suffer. 
Thus, in cases in which the first-in-time party is likely to suffer the 
loss of only the market value of the disputed asset, it would be reason-
able to condition the priority of the second-in-time party on his part-
ing with value in the traditional sense (i.e., actual value). By parting 
with actual value, the second-in-time party would equalize the losses 
likely to be suffered by him if the first-in-time party prevails to the 
losses the first-in-time party will likely suffer if the second-in-time 
party prevails. In such circumstances, no reduction of the losses suf-
fered by the parties would be attained by insisting upon the return of 
the disputed asset by the second-in-time party to the first-in-time 
party. 
In cases in which the first-in-time competing party is likely to suf-
fer the loss of both the market value and personal value of the disputed 
asset, however, it would be reasonable to condition the priority of the 
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second-in-time party on her parting with actual value and, in addition, 
on either her taking possession of, or acquiring legal title in, the asset. 
Again, the rendering of value would equalize the market value loss the 
first-in-time party will likely suffer if the second-in-time party prevails. 
Additionally, either by taking possession of the asset or acquiring title 
in it, the second-in-time party would equalize the personal value loss 
the first-in-time party will likely suffer if the second-in-time party 
prevails. By taking actual possession of an asset a person may begin to 
establish a unique personal connection with it, making it an important, 
even indispensable, part of his personality. Likewise, one's knowing 
that he has secured title to a certain asset may lead him to view the 
asset as his in the profound, personal sense of its being part of his 
identity in the world. Thus, both possession and title may serve as 
landmarks in the relation of a person to an asset. In securing either of 
them, a person may subjectively treat the asset as part of his life and 
begin to develop a personal relationship with it. 88 
Looked at from this perspective, the traditional GFPV concept89 
seems to envision triangle conflicts involving personal property assets 
that have been taken from their owners both against their will and 
without their fault. Put· differently, the traditional GFPV concept 
seems to reflect ex post efficiency considerations and considerations of 
justice in the sense of need and to apply to conflicts over personal 
property assets taken from first-in-time parties against their will. The 
requirement of value that is part of the traditional GFPV concept is 
supposed to serve as an equalizer for the market value loss a first-in-
time competing party will likely suffer. (And one should bear in mind 
that "value" means "adequate value": it should reasonably approxi-
mate the worth of the disputed asset.90) The requirement of acquisi-
tion of title that is part of that concept91 is supposed to serve as an 
equalizer for the personal element of loss that may result any time an 
owner of a personal property asset is deprived of it against his will. 
Why does the traditional GFPV concept condition the priority of 
the second-in-time party on her conforming with the most stringent 
88. The foregoing analysis assumes that the buyer develops a personal interest weighty 
enough to offset the personal value loss of the previous owner upon taking possession or acquir-
ing title in an asset. One may argue, however, that in many cases personal value develops over 
time, and therefore, only after the buyer has possessed or owned the asset for a certain period of 
time would the buyer's personal value loss equalize that of the previous owner. A priority rule 
which took this argument into account, however, would face numerous complications, such as 
how to determine the length of the period required to make the buyer's personal interest in the 
asset weighty enough. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
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requirements (rendering of actual value and acquisition of title)? Two 
answers suggest themselves. The first is that the roots of the tradi-
tional concept of GFPV lie in the preindustrial era92 in which triangle 
conflicts brought for the law's resolution typically involved personal 
property rather than fungible assets. Therefore, the traditional con-
cept was shaped to address conflicts in which first-in-time parties 
might suffer personal in addition to market value losses. The second 
answer focuses on the nature of the GFPV rule as a typical situations 
rule. The traditional GFPV rule is supposed to govern a variety of 
triangle conflicts, each having its own unique equities. The law has 
chosen to address all these conflicts through a single priority rule, the 
traditional GFPV rule. The rule may have been shaped, therefore, 
around the assumption that, for the second-in-time competing party to 
prevail, his potential losses should equalize the most extreme losses 
possibly suffered by a first-in-time party involved in the conflict. 
2. The Code's approach. 
(a) Value. As I showed earlier,93 under the Code's GFPV and 
BOCB concepts, a second-in-time competing party C may prevail in a 
conflict over a disputed asset without rendering any actual value, for 
under these two concepts of the Code, value can be rendered by a mere 
promise, le., consideration in the contractual sense. How can we ac-
count for this content of the value requirement? 
A possible way to rationalize the Code's value requirement is to 
say that the Code's GFPV and BOCB concepts apply considerations 
of ex ante efficiency and retributive justice to conflicts in which the 
first-in-time competing parties to the conflict possess a greater ability 
to prevent the conflict than do the second-in-time parties. Thus, be-
cause of the failure of the first-in-time parties to take the necessary 
precautionary measures to prevent the conflict, the second-in-time 
competing parties should prevail, even without rendering actual value. 
Determining that, as a general rule, first-in-time parties to a certain 
conflict can usually prevent the conflict, we would want to allocate the 
resulting loss to them. Conditioning the priority of members of the 
second-in-time category upon their parting with value in the tradi-
tional sense would cause any second-in-time party who paid only part 
92. For a review of cases from the late seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth 
century dealing with the GFPV doctrine see Harold R. Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Ti· 
ties, and Feckless Agents: Judges and Efficiency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith 
Purchase, 56 TuL. L. REv. 1, 15-32 (1981). The traditional GFPV doctrine can be traced to at 
least as early as the eighteenth century. "It seems to have been a common opinion in early times 
that a court of equity would give no assistance against a purchaser for value without notice." J. 
B. Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1 (1887). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 57-76. 
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of the disputed asset's price to lose the asset (to the first-in-time party) 
and the payment made by him to the intermediate wrongdoer. That, 
however, would run counter to the efficiency and justice considera-
tions that, given our assumptions, should have led to the allocation of 
these losses to the first-in-time parties to the conflict. Therefore, in 
cases of this type, we would want to allocate the disputed asset to 
second-in-time parties even when they have not fully paid the asset's 
price. Thus, the particular content the UCC gives to the value re-
quirement reflects an underlying assumption by the Code about the 
ability of first-in-time parties to avoid triangle conflicts.94 I will dis-
cuss the extent to which this assumption is justifiable in the subsequent 
parts of this article. 
(b) Title. I have noted that the Code does not provide any mean-
ingful clue as to whether a GFPV or a BOCB should acquire title in 
the disputed goods, or take possession of them, or whether a buyer 
may qualify as a GFPV or BOCB under the Code upon the formation 
of his contract, or upon identification of the goods to his contract. 95 
One way to solve this problem is to accept that the Code's priority 
rules endorse the assumption that first-in-time parties are better able 
to prevent the conflicts it governs. In that case, just as it would not 
make sense to condition the priority of second-in-time parties on their 
parting with full value, it would not make sense to condition the prior-
ity of these parties on their acquiring title to, or in their taking posses-
sion of, these goods. Rather, given these assumptions, second-in-time 
parties should enjoy priority upon the identification of the goods to 
their contract with the intermediate wrongdoer. 
A second possibility is that the Code contemplates triangle con-
flicts that involve goods used by their owners as fungible rather than as 
personal property. This explanation seems plausible on several 
grounds. First, the Code's design applies mainly to transactions in-
volving professionals and specialists who do not treat the goods they 
own as personal property. Second, the typical actor under the Code is 
probably a business corporation, an entity incapable of developing any 
personal attachment to goods. 96 Third, the Code is a product of the 
industrial era, in which most goods are fungible rather than per-
94. See also Dolan, supra note 8, at 1172 (stating that the voidable title doctrine recognizes 
that "possession induces reliance" in the buyer); Phillips, supra note 26, at 232-33 (stating that 
the UCC focuses on which party could have protected himself with_ the least cost). 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63, 73-76. 
96. In some extraordinary and rare cases, however, a corporation may suffer a personal value 
loss if deprived of an asset. This will be the case. for example, when a symbolic item which 
uniquely represents the corporation (e.g., the original of a painting reproduced as the corpora-
tion's logo) is stolen from it. 
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sonal.97 The Code's GFPV and BOCB concepts, therefore, may not 
explicitly spell out a title requirement because, based on a typical situ-
ations approach, the Code's priority rules envision conflicts over fungi-
ble goods, with respect to which second-in-time parties need not 
equalize the losses of first-in-time parties by acquiring title to disputed 
goods or by taking possession of them. 
(c) The tracing doctrine. Under the Code's definition of the term 
value, it might be possible for a second-in-time competing party to 
gain priority over disputed goods without parting with any actual 
value for them, or by offering only partial payment of their price. This 
outcome would result in a windfall to the prevailing second-in-time 
party to the extent of the unpaid balance of the price she owes. More-
over, ex post efficiency considerations and need considerations of jus-
tice dictate that, upon winning priority over the disputed goods, the 
second-in-time party pay the unpaid balance of the price she owes to 
the intermediate wrongdoer directly to the first-in-time party. Indeed, 
there is good reason to presume that the Code's drafters intended to 
furnish first-in-time parties with an entitlement to such unpaid bal-
ances when they adopted the Code's definition of the term value. This 
argument necessitates the introduction of the doctrine of tracing into 
our discussion. 
Tracing is the "right to follow property into its product"; it is ap-
97. In a fascinating study, the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss describes the develop-
ment of the relationship between persons and the assets they own. In archaic societies, assets are 
perceived as having personalities of their own, independent of their owners. In a more advanced 
stage, every asset is viewed as embodying the personality of its owner (and sales transactions, 
therefore, necessitate the purging of the asset from the spirit of its seller to enable the buyer to 
vest her spirit in the asset). Finally, in advanced societies, assets are treated instrumentally, 
independent of the persons who own them. MARCEL MAuss, THE GIFT (W.D. Halls trans., 
Rontledge 1990) (1950). Georg Simmel writes that "[f]or primitive people: in all parts of the 
world, the solidarity between the person and his possession is expressed in the custom that the 
possession, to the extent that it is personal, conquered or acquired by work, goes into the grave 
with the owner." GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 333 (David Frisby ed. & T. 
Bottomore & D. Frisby trans., 2d ed., Rontledge 1990) (1907). Simmel also writes about 
the extreme difficulty in buying commodities from native people. This has been explained 
by the fact that each object has a decidedly individual stamp of originality with regard to its 
origin and use. The tremendous labour applied to producing and decorating it and its exclu-
sive personal usage makes it part of the person himself. To part with it thus meets with the 
same resistance as parting with a limb of the body .... 
Id. at 403. Similarly, Henry Maine writes that "the separation of the Law of Persons from that 
of Things has no meaning in the infancy oflaw, [and) the rules belonging to the two departments 
are inextricably mingled together." HENRY s. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 251 (3d ed. 1888). 
The implications of the claim that in the modem era persons are surrounded by fungible 
objects were most thoroughly analyzed by Georg Simmel. In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel 
argued that in the modem economy "the individual object becomes irrelevant," and "the specific-
ity and individuality of objects becomes more and more indifferent, insubstantial and inter-
changeable to us." SIMMEL, supra at 301. He also argued that in the modem economy, the 
treatment of objects by their owners is characterized by "coldness and frivolity," id. at 393, and 
by "insecurity and disloyalty,'' id. at 404. 
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plicable "wherever a person wrongfully transfers property in which 
another has the beneficial interest, whether legal or equitable, and re-
ceives other property in exchange therefor.''98 "Through tracing, a 
person who in the first instance would be entitled to the restitution of 
money or other property is often permitted to assert his claim against 
a substituted asset - an asset which is traceable to or the product of 
such money or other property."99 The tracing doctrine is premised on 
the principle of unjust enrichment; it is designed to avoid an inappro-
priate gain of one person at the expense of another.HJO It is often im-
plemented through a number of more specific remedies such as 
constructive trust, equitable lien and subrogation. IOI 
The goal of minimizing the losses suffered by the parties involved 
in triangle confiictsI02 dictates that, in cases in which the second-in-
time competing party C is entitled to the disputed goods without ren-
dering actual value for them, the first-in-time competing party A be 
entitled to trace her right to the disputed goods against the intermedi-
ate wrongdoer B into that party's right to collect the price from the 
second-in-time competing party C. Thus, in cases of this type, A 
should be subrogated Io3 to the right of B to collect the price from C. 
The Code's concept of value for the purpose of the Code's GFPV and 
BOCB conceptsI04 may be viewed, therefore, as founded on the as-
sumption that for the purpose of minimizing total losses, A would be 
allowed to trace her claim to C. 
This assumption is supported by the text of the comment to a draft 
of an early forerunner of the Code, the Uniform Revised Sales Act of 
1944:I05 
"Value" . . . is defined very broadly . . . . It does not in itself require 
fresh payment, nor does it require that a payment freshly promised shall 
98. Scorr, supra note 46, § 507. 
99. PALMER, supra note 3, § 2.14. 
100. Id.; Oesterle, supra note 3, at 175-76. 
101. PALMER, supra note 3, § 1.5, § 2.14; Oesterle, supra note 3, at 184. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20, 34-36. 
103. "Subrogation may be defined as the substitution of another person in the place of a 
creditor, so that the person in whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in 
relation to the debt." 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 1 (1953) (footnote omitted). "Subrogation is 
closely akin to, if not part of, the equitable principle of 'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment.' •.• 
The object of subrogation is the prevention of injustice.'' Id., § 2 (footnotes omitted). "Subroga-
tion simply means substitution of one person for another; that is, one person is allowed to stand 
in the shoes of another and assert his rights.'' DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 4.3 at 251 (1973); see 
also PALMER, supra note 3, § 1.5(b); U.C.C. § 4-407 (1990). 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 57-76. 
105. UNIF. REv. SALES Acr (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code) (Proposed Final 
Draft No.l Apr. 27, 1944). 
126 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:95 
have been actually made before notice, 106 and cases to the contrary107 
are rejected .... But where the purchaser has not yet paid, any original 
claimant whose claim is wiped out by the good faith purchase is properly 
subrogated to the fraudulent transferor's right to the promised but still 
"d . 108 unpai pnce . . . . . 
In sum, the traditional GFPV concept seems suitable to govern 
triangle conflicts involving assets that have been used by their owners, 
the first-in-time competing parties, as personal property and of which 
these parties have been deprived against their will. In cases of this 
type, the value requirement in the traditional sense would equalize the 
market value loss suffered by the first-in-time party while the title re-
quirement would equalize the personal element of loss suffered by the 
first-in-time party. In contrast, the Code's GFPV and BOCB concepts 
seem suitable to apply to conflicts involving goods that have been used 
by their owners, the first-in-time competing parties, as fungible prop-
erty goods. In cases of this type, the second-in-time competing party 
would prevail even without rendering any actual value for the goods to 
the intermediate wrongdoing party. However, the first-in-time com-
peting party would be entitled to trace his claim as against the inter-
mediate party for the restitution of the goods, into the product of the 
goods, i.e., the right of the intermediate party to collect the goods' 
price from the second-in-time competing party. 
3. The Good Faith Purchase Doctrine: Between 
Efficiency and Justice 
As I have shown in the foregoing discussion, it is possible to ra-
tionalize the traditional GFPV concept in terms of the ex ante and ex 
post imperatives of allocative efficiency. This means that if we apply 
to the GFPV concept the pivotal question of the descriptive109 portion 
106. UNIF. REv. SALES Acr (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code) (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1 Apr. 27, 1944) § 57(2) ("'Value' with respect to good faith purchase for value means 
(a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract; or ••• (c) taldng goods or docu-
ments of title in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim."). 
107. Apparently, the Comment refers to the definition of the term "value" within the context 
of the traditional GFPV concept. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
108. UNIF. REv. SALES Acr (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code) (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1 Apr. 27, 1944) Comment on § 58: Transfer of Goods by Person With Defective 
Title; Good Faith Purchase of Goods. Application of the tracing doctrine in this context may be 
viewed as the equivalent of the means used by the traditional GFPV doctrine to mitigate the 
losses of second-in-time parties who lose assets to first-in-time parties. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 54-56; see also PALMER, supra note 3, §§ 2.14, 4.10 (tracing in cases of breach of 
contract); John P. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 175, 182-83 (1959) 
(same); Recent Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1290 (1935) (same); Oesterle, supra note 3, at 178· 
80 (same). 
109. See supra note 12. 
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of the economic analysis of law scholarship - is the common law 
efficient? - the answer should be yes. 
Even scholars not associated with the law and economics move-
ment have admitted that the efficiency criterion suggested by the 
scholarship of that movement is of considerable explanatory power 
when applied to a substantial number of common law doctrines.110 
Scholars associated with the law and economics movement have of-
fered two major explanations for its success. One is that common law 
judges have intuitively applied economic considerations in their 
rulemaking so that unknowingly and subconsciously they have ad-
dressed economic concerns.111 Another is the causal, litigant-oriented 
evolutionary explanation under which self-maximizing individuals 
have relitigated inefficient precedents more than efficient ones, result-
ing in a long-term trend toward efficiency.112 
As is well known, both explanations have been sharply criti-
cized.113 One recurrent criticism has been that the major motivating 
force of common law judges has been the desire to attain just results in 
the particular cases brought before them.114 Endorsing the hypothesis 
that, indeed, it has been a major concern for common law judges to 
come out with decisions that seem to do justice in particular litigated 
cases, however, I shall suggest that the efficiency criterion may have 
explanatory power because some of its imperatives converge with 
110. "Economic analysis and criticism of judge-made law are in flower now in the academic 
groves - partly, I readily admit, because they are so often illuminating, clarifying, and stimulat-
ing, as well as elegant and captivating." Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the 
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1027-28 (1978). "[S]triking successes [have 
been] achieved by the positive economic theory oflaw in showing a pervasive tendency for law -
judicial, common law - to regress on a norm of pure efficiency." Id. at 1038; see also CHARI.ES 
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 85-86 (1978) (Economic analysis of rights "is a recent, sophisticated 
elaboration of utilitarian thinking ..•• Because it is so subtle, powerful, and comprehensive, no 
consideration of rights can ignore it."). 
111. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 1, 19; POSNER, supra note 40, at 20-26; POSNER, 
supra note 20, at 372-73; Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TExAs L. REV. 
757, 764, 777-78 (1975); see also KRoNMAN & POSNER, supra note 40, at 5-6; Richard A. Posner, 
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 288-95 (1979). 
112. POSNER, supra note 20, at 360, 372-73; John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the 
Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law 
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules. 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is 
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolu-
tionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981). 
113. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 276-95; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 
263-66 (1985); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-50 (1987); J.M. 
Balkin, Too Good to be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1447 
(1987) (book review); Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and 
Legal Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (1980); Michelman, supra note 40; Michelman, supra note 
110; Wes Parsons, Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983). 
114. Balkin, supra note 113, at 1476-89; Fried, supra note 113, at 336-41, 352-53; Coleman, 
supra note 40, at 677-78; Michelman, supra note 110, at 1027-32, 1037-41, 1047. 
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some of the basic intuitions deriving from the sentiment of justice.115 
Scholars of the law and economics movement have recurrently 
demonstrated that in various contexts the law allocates entitlements 
against the "cheapest cost avoider," i.e., the party better located to 
avoid the conflict that calls for the law's intervention.116 Indeed, as we 
have seen, within the context of the GFPV concept, the good faith 
requirement arguably displays this very same logic.117 It is my hy-
pothesis, however, that the reason for the abundance of this pattern of 
allocation of entitlements in the law is that the cheapest cost avoider is 
also the most blameworthy party, i.e., the party that under basic senti-
ments of retributive justice deserves to assume liability.118 Thus, in 
allocating legal entitlements, common law judges have been motivated 
by a sentiment against the parties whose conduct could have been per-
ceived as faulty in the sense of its failure to prevent the occurrence of 
the conflict. 
Likewise, law and economics scholars have repeatedly demon-
strated that entitlements are allocated by the law in a manner designed 
to minimize the losses suffered by competing claimants.119 Indeed, as 
we have seen, the requirements of value and acquisition of title, consis-
tent within the traditional GFPV concept, may be viewed as serving 
this same goal. 120 It is my hypothesis, however, that this pattern of 
allocating entitlements persists because it coincides with the need cri-
terion of the distributive justice sentiment.121 Thus, in cases in which 
common law judges allocate legal entitlements, they are motivated by 
a sentiment favoring the party bound to suffer the greater loss if the 
other party prevails. The cases that the law and economics literature 
have interpreted as representing ex post efficiency concern for the min-
imization of the adverse effects of conflicts over entitlements can be 
interpreted as representing a justice concern for the allocation of enti-
115. See also supra text accompanying notes 21-36. Each of the criteria comprising the nor-
mative concept of justice has its equivalent in the actual sentiment of justice shared by human 
beings. See id. 
116. See, e.g., READINGS IN TIIE EcONOMICS OF CoNTRACT LAW 53-76 (Victor P. 
Goldberg ed., 1989); POSNER, supra note 40, at 83-85, 88-90, 94, 99, 114; SCHWARTZ & Scorr, 
supra note 5, at 22. 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
118. On the retributivist sentiment, see Posner, supra note 24; Yoram Shachar, The Fortui-
tous Gap in Law and Morality, CRIM. JUST. ETIIICS, Summer-Fall 1987, at 12. 
119. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 40, at 84, 87-88, 106-07, 118, 121-22; see also Daniel A. 
Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory EstoppeL· Contract Law and the "Invisible 
Handshake," 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 903, 906 n.12 (1985) (discussing "the emphasis in law and 
economics scholarship on the design of legal rules to affect behavior ex ante"). 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 81-108. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36. On the "need" sentiment of justice, see JEN· 
NIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR? 46-110 (1981). 
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tlements to the parties who need them most. 122 
IV. ENTRUSTMENT 
A. The Common Law, the Factors Acts, and the UCC 
For the purpose of our discussion of conflicts that result from the 
entrusting of goods, we must distinguish among three typical situa-
tions in which the entrustment conflict may arise: the commercial 
context, the semi-commercial context, and the noncommercial 
context. 
The commercial context: A, the manufacturer of a product, ap-
points B to be his selling agent in the market in which B is located. A 
delivers goods to B on consignment. B sells the goods to C and ab-
sconds with the proceeds. Alternatively, B pledges the goods to C to 
secure a loan made by C to B. 123 
The semi-commercial context: A, the owner of a painting, delivers 
it to B, a dealer, for restoration and repair. B repairs the painting and 
sells it to C. 
The noncommercial context: A, a university professor, plans to go 
abroad on sabbatical for a year. A entrusts his beloved painting to B, 
his friend, to keep it for him for the year. B sells the painting to C. 
Alternatively, B pledges the painting to C to secure a loan made by C 
toB. 
Initially, in addressing all these contexts, the common law gave 
precedence to A, the original owner, regardless of the conditions under 
which C had purchased the goods: under no circumstances could C 
defeat A's title in the goods. This rule accorded extreme protection to 
122. An argument similar to the one made here about the convergence between utility and 
justice was made over a hundred years ago by Sidgwick: 
[T]he claim to services that arises out of special need .•. may obviously be rested on an 
utilitarian basis . . • • [I]f I am made aware that .•• another's resources are manifestly 
inadequate to protect him from pain or serious discomfort ... my theoretical obligation to 
consider his happiness as much as my own becomes at once practical; and I am bound to 
make as much effort to relieve him as well as will not entail a greater loss of happiness to 
myself or others. If, however, the calamity is one which might have been foreseen and 
averted by proper care, my duty becomes more doubtful: for then by relieving him I seem to 
be in danger of encouraging improvidence in others. 
SIDGWICK, supra note 36, at 436. On the relation between the sentiment of justice and prescrip-
tions of utility, see ACKERMAN, supra note 36, at 1-22, 41-87; HARE, supra note 36, at 44-64, 
147-168; HUME, supra note 21, at 179-96; MILL, supra note 36, at 314-38; SIDGWICK, supra note 
36, at 264-94, 423-59. 
123. There is evidence that goods entrusted to agents make up a significant percentage of 
the goods that enter criminal redistribution. The same evidence suggests that persons who 
deal with entrusted goods, such as stockroom employees or truck drivers, are preferred 
sources of illegitimate merchandise because they are considered by receivers to be more 
reliable to deal with than shoplifters, addicts, and other common thieves. 
Weinberg, supra note 15, at 590. For the rule governing the conflict between the consignor and 
the general creditors of the consignee, see U.C.C. § 2-326 (1990). 
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the property interest of owners: owners who had not consented to 
part with their goods under the terms imposed on them by their en-
trustees were not compelled to do so. In the early part of the nine-
teenth century, however, an exception to this rule was carved out. 
The Factors Acts, widely enacted at that time in the United States and 
England, provided that anyone buying from a factor in good faith, i.e., 
without notice of limitations on the factor's authority, in reliance on 
the factor's possession of the goods, took good title against the true 
owner, even where the factor had acted beyond his authority.124 
Thus, the exception carved out by the Factors Acts was premised 
on a distinction between transactions made in the commercial context, 
on one hand, and transactions made in the semi-commercial and non-
commercial contexts, on the other. Only in cases where goods were 
entrusted to a merchant seller and only if the entrustment was made 
for the purpose of selling the goods (as opposed to entrustment for the 
purpose of repair, bailment, and so on), could a GFPV cut off the title 
of the owner-entruster.125 
The UCC also declines to adopt an all-encompassing entrustment 
priority rule that allows all GFPVs who purchase entrusted goods to 
prevail over owner-entrusters.126 Under the Code, a BOCB who 
purchases entrusted goods purchases all rights of the entruster in the 
goods.127 The Code follows the Factors Acts, however, in limiting its 
protection of buyers of entrusted goods to those who purchase from "a 
merchant who deals in goods of that kind."128 The Code nevertheless 
expands the protection accorded to such buyers by abolishing the for-
mer distinctions pertaining to the purpose of the entrustment: the en-
trustment rule of the Code applies to all cases in which possession is 
entrusted to a merchant, regardless of the particular purpose of the 
entrustment. Put differently, the entrustment rule of the Code applies 
to both commercial and semi-commercial cases. This also means that, 
under the Code, in all cases of entrustment in the noncommercial con-
124. Grant Gil.more, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 
1058 (1954); Warren, supra note 75, at 470.71; Katharine F. Jillison, Note, U.C.C. Section 2-403: 
A Reform in Need of Reform, 20 WM. & MARY L. RBv. 513, 537-39 (1979). 
125. Grant Gil.more, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, IS GA. L. RBv. 605, 608-10 (1981); Warren, supra note 
75, at 471-72. 
126. On entrustment under the UCC, see Gil.more, supra note 125, at 618·19; Fairfax Leary, 
Jr. & Warren F. Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. RBv. 50 (1981); Warren, 
supra note 75, at 472-75; Weinberg, supra note 92, at 32-36; John F. Cargill, Note, Entrustment 
Under U.C.C. Section 2-403 and Its Implications/or Article 9, 9 CAMPBELL L. RBv. 407 (1987); 
Jillison, supra note 124, at 551-53. 
127. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 2-403(3) (1990); see also U.C.C. § 2A-305(2) (1990). 
128. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1990); see also U.C.C. § 2A-305(2) (1990). 
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text, the nemo dat rule would apply and the owner-entruster would be 
able to defeat the interest of the purchaser.129 
B. Consideration as Value 
As noted earlier, 130 under the value requirement of the traditional 
GFPV concept, the purchaser needs to part with actual resources, yet 
this is not the case under the BOCB concept of the UCC. Under the 
Code, for the buyer of entrusted goods C to prevail over the owner-
entruster A, the buyer needs to be a BOCB, and "buying" in this con-
text includes not only parting with actual resources but also buying 
"on credit," i.e., merely promising future payment or other transfer of 
resources in exchange for the goods. A buyer who enters in good faith 
into a contract for the purchase of entrusted goods would enjoy prior-
ity over the adverse claim of the owner-entruster, even though the 
buyer may not have parted with any actual value and may have be-
come or should have become aware of the owner's claim, before value 
passed. 
Why is it that the Code enables a buyer who has parted with no 
actual value to prevail over an owner-entruster? 
A possible answer to this question is that the Code presumes that 
the entruster has a greater ability to prevent the occurrenee of the con-
flict. Therefore, on the basis of ex ante efficiency considerations and 
retributive justice considerations, the Code allocates an entitlement to 
the disputed goods to the buyer and the loss resulting from the conflict 
to the owner-entruster.131 
Two arguments support the Code's presumption that, in the com-
mercial context, the entruster can prevent the occurrence of the con-
flict more easily than the buyer. First, in the commercial setting, the 
relationship of the entruster and the entrustee is usually intended to be 
stable and continuous. Therefore, it is easier for the entruster to bear 
the first-starter cost of gathering information for verifying the honesty 
of the entrustee than it is for the buyer, whose relationship with the 
entrustee is not necessarily meant to be continuous and institutional-
ized.132 Moreover, once the entruster-entrustee relationship becomes 
129. In those cases, however, the purchaser would still prevail if the doctrine of estoppel 
could be applied against the entruster. See UNIF. SALES Acr § 23 (1950); Smith, supra note 75, 
at 61; Warren, supra note 75, at 470, 475; see also Ken Kanjian, Note, The Nemo Dat Rule and 
Estoppel by Representation and Estoppel by Negligence, 8 SYDNEY L. REv. 698 (1979); Christina 
L. Kunz, Motor Vehicle Ownership Disputes Involving Certificate of Title Acts and Article Two of 
the U.C.C., 39 Bus. LAW. 1599, 1646-48 (1984). 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49, 59·60. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
132. Dolan, supra note 8, at 1171. 
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institutionalized, the entruster gains an additional opportunity both to 
acquaint himself further with the conduct of the entrustee and to fore-
see potential dishonesty on his part. 
Second, the entruster can protect himself against misconduct on 
the part of the entrustee by insisting upon a guarantee of the en-
trustee's liabilities toward the entruster by such means as cash deposit, 
guarantee, or security interest. Again, such precautionary measures 
can be expected of the entruster, but not of the buyer, because, in the 
commercial entrustment case, the relationship of the entruster with 
the entrustee, unlike that of the buyer and the en trustee, is more likely 
to be continuous and institutionalized.133 
Another possible explanation for the Code's position against en-
trusters and in favor of buyers rests on the rationale of estoppel.134 
Buyers who purchase goods from merchant sellers usually assume 
their sellers have valid title to the goods possessed by them. There-
fore, any person who delivers goods to a merchant while limiting his 
authority to sell these goods effectively deceives buyers who justifiably 
rely on the seller's possession. In other words, even though, as a gen-
eral rule, our law has not adopted an ostensible ownership rule (i.e., 
generally buyers are not entitled to deduce from their sellers' posses-
sion that those sellers own the goods they dispose),135 within the par-
ticu1ar context of the marketplace our law recognizes an ostensible 
ownership rule against those who create a division between ownership 
and possession.136 
133. See also Epstein, supra note 5, at 13-14; Weinberg, supra note 15, at 591; Baird & Jack-
son, supra note 5, at 187, 189-90; Jackson, supra note 5, at 20..26. 
At least the first above-mentioned argument applies to noncommercial entrustments as well: 
in the noncommercial setting, the entrustment will usually take place between persons having 11 
stable, long-term relationship, so that, as between the entruster and the buyer, the former would 
usually enjoy a clear informational advantage over the latter in terms of his ability to foresee 
potential misconduct on the part of the entrustee. Nonetheless, both the Factors Acts and the 
UCC have excluded from their protection purchasers of entrusted goods in the noncommercial 
context. 
In both the semi-commercial and noncommercial cases of entrustment, one can make an 
additional argument for supposing that the entruster is the party better located to prevent the 
conflict: as a general rule, it is easier to provide information "downstream" than it is to ferret out 
information "upstream." In our context, it is reasonable to assume that the owner-entruster, 
who already had possession of the disputed goods prior to their entrustment, would be better 
located to inform potential purchasers of his interest (by engraving or branding) than would the 
potential purchaser to discover the existence of the owner-entruster. See Jackson, supra note 5, 
at 20..26. 
134. SCHWARTZ & SCOOT, supra note 5, at 503; Dolan, supra note 8, at 1170; William H. 
Lawrence, The "Created by His Seller" Limitation of Section 9-307(1) of the U. CC.: A Provision 
in Need of an Articulated Policy, 60 IND. L.J. 73 (1984). 
135. See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 5. 
136. Note that our law does not protect the institution of the market per se. Thus, buyers of 
stolen goods are not protected by our law even when they buy their goods from merchant sellers. 
See infra. Likewise, the Code's entrustment rule does not protect all buyers of entrusted goods 
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Thus, we may say that, on the basis of ex ante efficiency considera-
tions and retributive justice considerations, it is the Code's position 
that losses resulting from entrustment conflicts should be borne by 
owners-entrusters rather than by buyers who purchase entrusted 
goods. For this reason, the Code grants priority to buyers of entrusted 
goods even before they have parted with actual value.137 
C. The Buyer's Interest in the Goods 
As precondition to his priority over the conflicting claim of the 
owner-entruster, what kind of legal interest in the goods must the 
buyer of entrusted goods acquire while remaining in good faith? The 
importance of this question stems from the structure of our priority 
rules: whenever these rules set forth several conditions for the priority 
of a purchaser, in order for the purchaser to prevail he should meet 
("combine") these conditions at one point in time during his transac-
tion. Thus, for example, a rule that conditions priority of a purchaser 
upon his parting with value, acting in good faith and acquiring title in 
the disputed asset means that the purchaser should both acquire title 
and part with value while acting in good faith. 138 Therefore, when we 
ask what kind of legal interest the buyer should have in the goods as a 
condition to his priority, we actually mean to ask until what stage in 
his transaction the buyer should lack actual or presumed knowledge of 
the adverse claim of the owner-entruster. 
As I have noted earlier, four possible approaches suggest them-
selves with respect to this issue:139 the buyer should acquire title in 
the goods; the goods should be identified to the contract (of the en-
trustee and the buyer); the buyer should take possession of the goods; 
or the buyer may qualify as a BOCB upon entering into her sales con-
who purchase their goods from merchant sellers, but only buyers who purchase entrusted goods 
from merchant-entrustees (that is, if the entrustment took place in a transaction prior to the one 
involving the merchant and his seller, the buyer from the merchant seller would not be protected 
under § 2-403(2) of the Code). Thus, apparently, it is the estoppel rationale - not the policy of 
sanctioning and reinforcing the operation of the institution of the market - that underlies the 
Code's entrustment rule. In a similar fashion, § 9-307(1) of the Code enables a BOCB to cut off a 
prior security interest only if the buyer's seller had created the security interest. Therefore, a 
buyer who purchases a computer from a dealer would take it subject to any security interest that 
had attached to it prior to the dealer's acquiring it. On the estoppel rationale within this context, 
see Lawrence, supra note 134. 
137. One should bear in mind, however, that ex post efficiency considerations and need con-
siderations (see supra text accompanying notes 12-36) mandate that an owner-entruster who has 
lost her goods to a buyer would still be entitled to the tracing remedy, i.e., the owner-entruster 
would be entitled to collect from the buyer the unpaid balance the buyer owes to the intermediate 
wrongdoing entrustee. See supra text accompanying notes 95-108. 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63, 73-76. 
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tract. As noted earlier, 14-0 the definition of the term BOCB in the Code 
does not offer any guidance with regard to this issue, and the courts 
have endorsed all four of these possible approaches. 
As I have argued earlier, 141 if one assumes that, on the basis of ex 
ante efficiency considerations and considerations of retributive justice, 
it is the policy of the Code to allocate losses resulting from entrust-
ment conflicts to entrusters, one should enable purchasers of entrusted 
goods to enjoy priority upon the identification of the goods to their 
contracts. But, at least in cases of commercial entrustment, one 
should reach the same conclusion even if one approaches the conflict 
from the perspective of ex post efficiency considerations and need con-
siderations of justice. From the perspective of these considerations, 
the requirements of possession and acquisition of title might be viewed 
as equalizers of personal loss elements that might be suffered by first-
in-time competing parties whose goods have been taken from them 
against their will. Given the fungible nature of the goods involved in 
commercial entrustments, this owner-entruster will never suffer a per-
sonal element of loss. It would be superfluous, therefore, to insist that 
BOCBs involved in such conflicts take possession of the goods or ac-
quire title in them. Rather, these BOCBs should prevail upon the 
identification of the goods to their contract with the intermediate 
entrustee. 142 
V. CONFLICTING TRANSACTIONS 
B undertakes to sell goods or land, or rights therein, to A. Before 
the transaction is completed, B undertakes to sell a conflicting right in 
the same goods or land to C Completion of both transactions is le-
gally impossible. A priority rule is needed to determine which of the 
two competing parties is entitled to a right in the goods or land. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
142. For a similar position, though on the basis of other arguments, see Dolan, supra note 8, 
at 1155-56, 1187-89. In many cases there will be a convergence between the identification stage 
and the contractmaking stage: U.C.C. § 2-50l(l)(a) (1990) provides that in the absence of ex-
plicit agreement between the parties, identification occurs "when the contract is made if it is for 
the sale of goods already existing and identified." If the contract is for the sale of future goods, 
the Code's general rule is that identification occurs "when goods are shipped, marked or other-
wise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers." U.C.C. § 2-50l(l)(b) (1990); 
see also U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(c) (1990) (regarding identification of farm goods). 
In contrast to the commercial case of entrustment, in the noncommercial and semi-commer-
cial cases, the owner-entruster expects to retake the goods from the entrustee and, in case he loses 
them to the second-in-time competing party, the owner-entruster may suffer a personal loss (in 
addition to a loss of the market value of the goods). In those cases, therefore, if one intends to 
resolve the conflict on the basis of ex post efficiency considerations and need considerations of 
justice, it would make sense to require that the BOCB take possession of the goods or acquire 
title in them as a condition to his priority. 
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A. Goods: Seller-in-Possession Conflicts 
The UCC treats the seller-in-possession case as a subcategory of 
the entrustment case. Section 2-403(3) of the Code defines the term 
entrustment to include "any acquiescence in retention of possession." 
Therefore, under the priority rule of section 2-403(2) of the Code, in 
cases in which the seller is a merchant, a BOCB would be able to 
defeat the claim of the previous purchaser.143 A similar approach was 
adopted by the Code's predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act (USA).144 
B. Land 
1. The Common Law 
The priority rules of the common law for resolving conflicting 
transactions in land consist of a general rule with two qualifying 
exceptions. 
a. The general rule: priority in time is priority in right. The gen-
eral rule of the common law for resolving conflicting transactions for 
the sale of legal interests in land connects priority of rights with rank 
in time: qui prior est tempore potior est jure (he who is first in time is 
first in right).145 
b. First exception: good faith purchase for value. Under the first 
exception to the foregoing general rule, where the first-in-time pur-
chaser has not yet acquired legal title and the party to the second 
transaction is a GFPV, that party prevails, i.e., his right will be 
deemed free from the claim of the previous purchaser.146 
c. Second exception: estoppel and negligence. Under the second 
exception to the above-mentioned general priority rule, the party first 
in time may lose her initial priority because of the general doctrine of 
estoppel: where a false representation of rights with respect to the 
143. On conflicting lease transactions, see U.C.C. §§ 2A-304(1), 2A-304(2) (1990). 
144. Section 25 of the USA provided: 
Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods .•. the delivery or 
transfer by that person ••• of the goods .•. under any sale, pledge, or other disposition 
thereof, to any person receiving and paying value for the same in good faith and without 
notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or 
transfer were expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same. 
UNIF. SALES Acr § 23 (1950). 
145. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 48, § 17.1; CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra 
note 46, § 11.9, at 775, 778; PALMER, supra note 3, § 16.5; Ames, supra note 92, at 8-9; Lawrence 
Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine that ''First in Time is First in Right," 64 NEB. L. REv. 349, 
365 (1985); Durfee, supra note 2, at 466-67; Note, Purchase for Value and Without Notice of 
Equitable Interests, 24 HARV. L. REV. 490, 490-92 (1911). 
146. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 48, §§ 17.1, 17.9-17.17; PALMER, supra 
note 3, § 16.5; TIFFANY, supra note 46, §§ 574, 585; Berger, supra note 145, at 365; Durfee, supra 
note 2, at 469-71; Note, supra note 145, at 491. 
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land is made by the first-in-time party (e.g., by making a statement as 
to the rights in the land without mentioning that party,s claim) and 
the second-in-time party relies on that representation, the first-in-time 
party would be estopped from asserting her priority, and the second-
in-time party would be entitled to her right even if that party had re-
ceived notice of the existence of the prior claim before completion of 
the transaction.147 
Likewise, where the first-in-time party negligently fails to make use 
of some available means for informing potential subsequent purchasers 
of his claim, and a second-in-time party enters into his contract for the 
land without knowledge of the earlier transaction, the second-in-time 
party would be entitled to his right even if he had received notice of 
the prior claim before completion of his transaction.148 
2. Recording Statutes 
In terms of their treatment of the issue of conflicting transactions, 
the recording statutes of the various states of the United States can be 
divided into three general groups: 
a. Notice statutes. In about half of the states, if A fails to record 
her deed, C prevails if she is a GFPV, whether or not she records her 
right.149 
b. Notice-race statutes. In roughly the other half of the states, if A 
fails to record her deed, C prevails if she is a GFPV who recorded her 
conveyance before A recorded hers.150 
c. Pure race statutes. Under a third approach (adopted in Louisi-
ana and North Carolina), C may defeat A merely by recording first, 
even without qualifying as GFPV.151 
C. Conflicting Assignments 
D undertakes a certain contractual obligation toward B. B assigns 
his right against D to A. Subsequently, B assigns the same right to C. 
A priority rule is needed to determine which of the two competing 
parties is entitled to B's right against D. "In few common law areas 
147. Ames, supra note 92, at 9; Durfee, supra note 2, at 485-87; Durfee, supra note 3, at 699; 
66 AM. JUR. 2o Records and Recording Laws, § 160 (1973). 
148. REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 314 (1959); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
supra note 48, § 17.2; Scorr, supra note 46, §§ 314, 477; PALMER, supra note 3, § 16.5. 
149. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 11.9 at 776; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. 
KRIER, PROPERTY 807 (1981). 
150. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 11.9, at 776; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 
149, at 808. 
151. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 11.9, at 776; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 
149, at 806-07. 
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did so many diverse rules establish themselves for so long and so in-
conclusively contend among themselves for supremacy,"152 but we 
can discern three major common law approaches. 
1. The New York Rule: First in Time Is First in Right 
In some states - most notably New York - the rule has been 
that, between two successive assignees of the same right, the first in 
time is first in right, i.e., the assignee first in time is preferred even if-
to take the strongest case - the second assignee had given value for 
the right without notice of the earlier assignment and had actually 
received performance from the obligor.153 
2. The Restatement Rule 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as under the New 
York rule, the basic rule is that "the right of an assignee is superior to 
that of a subsequent assignee of the same right from the same as-
signor."154 Unlike the New York rule, however, the initial priority of 
the first assignee is not absolute; it may be overruled: in circumstances 
in which "the subsequent- assignee in good faith and without knowl-
edge or reason to know of the prior assignment gives value and obtains 
payment or satisfaction of the obligation," the right of the subsequent 
assignee will be preferred.155 
3. The English Rule 
Under the so-called English rule, customarily traced to the case of 
Dearle v. Hall 156 priority between competing assignees is determined 
by the order of notification of their assignments to the obligor D: a 
later assignee prevails if he was the first to notify the obligor, provided 
he took his assignment without notice of the earlier assignment and for 
value.151 
4. The Code's Approach 
To a certain extent, these approaches have been superseded by the 
152. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 25.6, at 670. 
153. /d.; ARTHUR CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 902 (1952). 
154. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 342 (1981). 
155. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 342(b)(i) (1981). 
156. 3 Russ. l, 58-59, 38 Eng. Rep. 475, 494-95 (Ch. 1828). 
157. CoRBIN, supra note 153, § 902; 2 GILMORE, supra note 7, § 25.6; HAROLD G. HAN-
BURY, MODERN EQUITY 584-87 (9th ed., Ronald H. Maudsley ed., 1969); PALMER, supra note 
3, § 16.5; SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 71-77 (26th ed., R. Megaruy & P. Balcer eds., 1966); 
E. TYLER & N. PALMER, CROSSLEY VAINE'S PERSONAL PROPERTY 274-78 (5th ed. 1973). 
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applicable provisions of article 9 of the UCC. Following the pre-Code 
accounts receivable statutes, the Code subordinates assignment of "ac-
counts" (le., rights to payment not evidenced by instruments or chat-
tel papers)158 to the general system of filing established under article 9. 
Thus, the general rule under article 9 protects an assignee against the 
subsequent assignment of his right, as long as a financing statement 
evidencing the assignment has been filed. 159 Accordingly, the general 
pure race priority rule of article 9, which determines priority between 
conflicting claims according to "priority in time of filing or perfec-
tion," 160 applies also to the conflict between two assignees of the same 
right.161 
D. Rationalizing Conflicting Transactions Priority Rules: 
General Considerations 
As we have seen, most rules that govern the various cases of con-
flicting transactions in our law share a common structure: initial pri-
ority is accorded to the first~in-time competing party A, yet the 
second-in-time party C may defeat that priority by qualifying as 
GFPV.162 These rules, therefore, are premised on the assumption that 
conflicting transactions cases should be settled by ex post efficiency 
considerations and need considerations and not by ex ante efficiency 
and retributive justice considerations.163 
158. u.c.c. § 9-106 (1990). 
159. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(l)(b), 9-302(l)(e) (1990). 
160. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1990). 
161. It should be noted, however, that certain transactions for the assignment of accounts are 
excluded from these rules of article 9 and are supposed to be governed, therefore, by the common 
law rules of the states (as embodied in the three above-mentioned approaches, see supra text 
accompanying notes 153-57). See U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1990). Additionally, the filing requirement 
does not apply to cases in which the assignment "does not alone or in conjunction with other 
assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the 
assignor." U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(e) (1990). It should be noted, however, that article 9 applies only 
to assignments of rights for the payment of money. Therefore, the above-mentioned common law 
rules of the states also apply to all assignments of rights whose content is other than the payment 
of money. 
162. Thus, in cases of confilcting transactions in land, this structure of priority rules is em-
bodied in the priority rules of the common law as well as in notice recording statutes and, to a 
certain extent, also in notice-race recording statutes. Likewise, in cases of confilcting assign-
ments, this structure of priority rules is embodied in the Restatement rule and, to a certain ex-
tent, also in the English rule. This same pattern is also embodied in the seller-in-possession 
priority rules of the USA and the UCC. 
163. Again, if we were to apply a case-by-case procedure for resolving confilcting transac-
tions cases on ex post efficiency and need considerations, we would be able to identify the greater 
loss bearer in any particular case of confilct. Cost considerations, however, mandate adoption of 
the alternative, typical situations procedure of confilct resolution. See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 37-38. 
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1. The ''First in Time First in Right" Rule and 
Ex Post/Need Considerations 
139 
When B undertakes to sell an asset or a certain right in it to A and 
then to sell a conflicting right to C: there is one obvious difference 
between A's transaction and C's transaction with B: A's transaction 
precedes C's transaction in time. The question is whether this differ-
ence is relevant in determining whether A or C prevails in this 
competition.164 
A possible response is that ex post, when the conflict between the 
two parties arises, preferring the earlier promisee A would minimize 
the losses suffered by the parties as a result of B's dishonesty, because 
A, being the first-in-time party, is more likely to suffer the greater loss 
if C prevails than vice versa. 
In this context, expectation losses are immaterial: it is impossible 
to set forth a general a priori assumption that whenever two promisees 
compete over the same right, the expectation interest of either of them 
is greater than that of the other, or that the expectation losses likely to 
be suffered by either one of them, in case her contractual expectation is 
frustrated, are greater than those of the other. 
This is not true, however, in the case of reliance and restitution 
losses. There may indeed exist a positive correlation between the 
length of the time during which promisees rely on contractual 
promises given them and the magnitude of their reliance on these 
promises: the longer the period of reliance, the larger is the magnitude 
of the reliance. Therefore, a rule that grants preference to the prom-
isee who is first in time may be viewed as minimizing the reliance and 
restitution losses of promisees by protecting that competing party 
likely to suffer greater reliance and restitution losses if his expectation 
of the promise's fulfillment is frustrated. 
For example, assume B is the owner of a store in a shopping 
center. On January 1, B undertakes to lease the store to A, starting on 
July 1. On March l, B enters a similar contract with C. Assume that 
the conflict between A and C becomes conspicuous to the parties on 
May 1. Following the creation of their contracts, and in reliance on 
their expectation to take possession of the store on July 1, both A and 
C will take certain actions and abstain from taking other actions. 
Each will pay the lessor one or several down payments (thus creating a 
restitution interest in relation to the lessor); each will avoid looking for 
164. "Every one knows and follows the rule of ordinary life that applies to such prosaic 
matters as waiting in line for theater tickets or in a cafeteria: 'first come, first served.' " Richard 
A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 
667, 669 (1986). 
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other stores that would have fit his purposes; and each will enter con-
tracts with third parties (e.g., contracts with architects, carpenters, 
employees, suppliers, and advertisers) to establish, promote, and oper-
ate the business intended to be run by him in the store. With each 
action, the parties will create a reliance interest in relation to the 
lessor.165 
The rule granting priority to the party first in time, therefore, 
treats antecedence in time as a proxy166 for greater reliance and resti-
tution losses. It addresses not only the ex post efficiency consideration 
and the need consideration of minimizing the losses suffered by com-
peting promisees, but also the additional above-mentioned ex post con-
cern, namely that of minimizing the administrative costs involved in 
resolving the conflicts between competing promisees:167 the simple, 
technical factor of rank in time serves as a determinant of the complex 
issue of magnitude of reliance and restitution losses.16s 
165. This example envisions conflicting transactions in land, but we could easily adapt it to 
cases of conflicting transactions in goods and in rights. 
166. A legal proxy is an easily identifiable factor whose existence can serve as a reliable 
indication for the existence of another state of the world whose verification is much more diffi-
cult. Proxies are commonly used in the natural sciences - fever as a proxy for the existence of a 
virus in the body of a patient is the most obvious example - and in our social life: the way one 
dresses and the car she drives are the most obvious and trivial examples in this context. Proxies 
are abundant in the law as well. Obvious examples here are the age oflegal majority as a proxy 
for a person's ability to reasonably take care of her interests; the hypothetical damages formula of 
contract law as a proxy for the losses actually suffered by the injured party in case of breach of 
contract; the liquidity test for insolvency under bankruptcy law as a proxy for a debtor's ratio of 
unencumbered assets and outstanding liabilities; and consideration as a proxy for assent in con-
tract law. 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. 
168. Cf. Epstein, supra note 164, at 670 (''The first possession rule represents an ingenious, if 
intuitive, recognition that time provides the best one dimensional ruler for making the needed 
mapping. Time offers a unique measuring rod, sufficient in principle to resolve two or two thou-
sand competing claims for priority. Whoever got there first, wins ..•• [A]n enormous decision-
making capability is contained in a single variable.") 
The "first in time first in right" rule applies no matter what the type and magnitude of the 
two conflicting rights. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 48, § 17.10; Ames, 
supra note 92, at 5, 8-10. One could have argued that the foregoing reasoning is cogent only with 
respect to cases in which the two parties compete over a right of the same kind (for example, 
both have been promised ownership or a lease of the same asset) or only in cases in which the 
earlier right is of larger magnitude than the later competing right. But what about cases in which 
the later conflicting right is of larger magnitude than the earlier right (e.g., lease versus owner-
ship, easement versus lease)? Would the above reasoning hold for such cases as well? 
In terms of the restitution interest, it might be argued that a positive' relation exists between 
the magnitude of a right and the magnitude of the restitution losses suffered by its promisee in 
case his expectation to acquire it is frustrated: the greater the magnitude of the right the greater 
its worth and, therefore, other things being equal, the greater the restitution losses of the prom-
isee of that right at a given period of time. If this is true, a first-in-time promisee should, indeed, 
prevail over a later promisee only if the magnitude of the right promised to the earlier promisee is 
at least of the magnitude of the right promised to the later promisee. 
The assumption lying at the root of the foregoing reasoning is that there exists a positive 
relation between the magnitude of a right in an asset and its worth. But will the assumption be 
compelling in all cases? How would you rank a lease versus an easement or a mortgage versus a 
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2. The Good Faith Purchaser as the Greater Loss Bearer 
The ex post/need rationale of minimizing the reliance and restitu-
tion losses of promisees can also explain why, in cases of conflicting 
transactions, the party first in time (A) may lose her initial priority to a 
party second in time (CJ who qualifies as good faith purchaser for 
value. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, when both competing promisees 
are still in the contractual stage of their transactions, it would be rea-
sonable to assume that the reliance and restitution interests of the 
party first in time are greater than those of the party second in time. 
But there is one clear and unequivocal case in which the assumption 
must be the inverse. This occurs when the transaction of the party 
first in time is still in the contractual stage while the transaction of the 
party second in time has been completed and has entered its proprie-
tary stage, making him a GFPV in the traditional sense (i.e., a party 
who has rendered value and has acquired legal title in the asset). In 
such a case, in terms of the restitution interest, it would be reasonable 
to assume that, whereas the party first in time has paid only part of the 
price due, the party second in time has parted with all or at least most 
of the price due for the asset. Likewise, the reliance of a party claim-
ing title in an asset is surely much greater than that of a party who 
bases his claim to the asset only upon a contractual undertaking of its 
owner. 
E. Evaluating Conflicting Transactions Priority Rules: 
Particular Cases 
1. Goods: Seller-in-Possession Conflicts 
Under the UCC, a second-in-time party involved in a seller-in-pos-
session conflict, should prevail if he is a BOCB. Yet value in this con-
text is not actual value, as it is under the traditional GFPV concept, 
but consideration in the contractual sense.169 This means, that the 
Code allocates losses resulting from seller-in-possession conflicts to 
lease? In such cases it seems difficult to support any a priori assumption as to the relation be-
tween the magnitude of the right and its worth. Therefore, the argument that, in terms of the 
restitution losses likely to be suffered by the parties, the magnitude of competing rights should be 
taken into account in determining their priority, becomes less compelling. 
Things become even less clear when one focuses on reliance losses. Here the relation between 
the magnitude of the promised right and the magnitude of the reliance losses suffered by the 
promisee if his expectation to purchase it is frustrated is even more obscure: a promisee may 
incur relatively large reliance expenses even in reliance on a right of a relatively small magnitude 
(such as a right-of-way easement). Therefore, it seems that, in terms of the potential reliance 
losses of the parties, the above reasoning that connects length of reliance and magnitude of reli-
ance may hold true in cases in which the later right is of greater magnitude than the earlier right. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47, 66-67. 
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first-in-time competing parties rather than to second-in-time parties. 170 
In giving priority to the claim of the second-in-time party where that 
party has conveyed only minimal value, the Code apparently relies on 
ex ante efficiency and retributive justice considerations. Although it is 
hard to presume that, as a general rule, first-in-time competing parties 
enjoy a clear advantage over second-in-time parties in terms of their 
ability to prevent the occurrence of seller-in-possession conflicts, we 
nonetheless can justify the position of the Code on grounds of estop-
pel: buyers who purchase goods from merchant sellers expect their 
sellers to have valid title to the goods possessed by them. 171 
2. Land 
The basic distinction that should govern conflicting transactions in 
land is one between cases in which land transactions are supposed to 
be recorded and cases in which they are not. 
In the former case, the law establishes a means to enable purchas-
ers of interests in land to publicize their contractual claims and to 
make any potential future purchaser of a conflicting right aware of the 
existence of the previous claim's existence.172 In such cases, ex ante 
170. Cf. supra text accompanying note 137. 
171. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 134-36. The concept of estoppel differs from the ex 
ante efficiency/retributive justice concept. The doctrine of estoppel applies whenever a person 
creates a false representation of a certain factual or legal state of the world on which another 
person justifiably relies. In such a case, for the purpose of resolving the representee's claim 
against the representer, the misrepresented state of the world would be presumed. The concept 
of ex ante efficiency/retributive justice is concerned with the ability of two parties who compete 
over an entitlement to have avoided their competition in the first place. A certain overlap be-
tween the two concepts exists, however, because the ability of the representer to avoid the mis-
representation is taken into account in determining whether she should be bound by it, and the 
ability of the representee to discover the true state of the world is taken into account in determin· 
ing whether her reliance has been justified. 
Under ex post efficiency considerations and need considerations of justice, however, a losing 
first-in-time party involved in a seller-in-possession conflict should be able to trace his claim to 
the goods into the right of his seller to the unpaid balance owed him by the second-in-time party. 
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 137-38. It should be noted that unlike the UCC, § 25 of the 
USA applied the same priority rule to seller-in-possession conflicts involving merchant and 
nonmerchant sellers. 
172. Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 53, 62-64 (1983); Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 183, 185; Epstein, supra note 5, at 18; 
Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good Faith Purchaser. 16 J, 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 15-16, 27-35 (1987). 
"[I]n the majority of American jurisdictions, the recording statutes have been liberally con· 
strued to effect their purpose, so as to include any instrument by which the ownership of or title 
to land is affected." 66 AM. JuR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 54, at 374 (1973). 
Following the rule that recording statutes are generally liberally construed so as to include 
any instrument by which the ownership or title ofland is affected, it is held in many jurisdic· 
tions that a recording statute which, in general terms, provides for the recording of convey-
ances of land, or of instruments affecting title, authorizes the record of an executory 
contract for the sale of real property. 
Id., § 57, at 376. For example, § 294(1) of the New York Real Property Law provides that 
" '[a]n executory contract ••. may be recorded in the office of the recording officer of any county 
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efficiency considerations and considerations of retributive justice dic-
tate that a first-in-time party A who enters a contract for the purchase 
of a right in land and fails to record his claim (by entering a caution in 
the record to reflect his contractual claim before the conveyance of a 
property interest in the land) should lose that right to any subsequent 
competing promisee C (who, presumably, entered his transaction with 
respect to the land following inspection of the records).173 Indeed, we 
may say that any first-in-time promisee who fails to record his con-
tract fails to make use of a simple means available for preventing the 
conflict and, therefore, does not deserve to have his interest 
protected.114 
In contrast, in cases in which no recordation systern governs trans-
actions in land, it seems that no competing party should be deemed 
better able to prevent the conflict. Therefore, in such cases, the con-
flict between the two competing parties should be governed by ex post 
efficiency considerations and by need considerations of justice. 
a. Pure race recording statutes. In every American state, statutes 
provide for maintenance of land title records.175 This means that in 
the United States conflicting transactions in land may be governed by 
ex ante efficiency and retributive justice considerations. These consid-
erations dictate that in cases of conflicting transactions in land the first 
promisee who records her contract should prevail, provided she has 
acted in good faith in entering her contract.176 No state, however, has 
structured its priority rules in such a manner. The closest manifesta-
tion of this reasoning can be found in the pure race recording statutes 
adopted by only two states. Yet these statutes grant priority not to the 
party who is first to record her contractual claim with respect to the 
land, but rather to the party who is first to record her property interest 
in which any of the real property to which it relates is situated.'" N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 
§ 294(1) (McKinney 1989). "But other authorities, limiting the recording acts to instruments 
that transfer the legal title, do not require the recording of a contract for the sale of real prop-
erty ••.. " 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws, § 57, at 377 (1973). 
173. "The main purpose of recording instruments is to give notice to subsequent purchasers 
and encumbrancers." 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws, § 98, at 400 (1973). "A 
person, in dealing with another in respect to real estate, may rely on the record title to the 
property, in the absence of actual knowledge of the title in fact, or of facts sufficient to put him on 
inquiry in respect thereto.'' Id., § 99, at 401. "Persons protected ordinarily against a failure to 
record include purchasers and encumbrancers ..•• " Id.,§ 157, at 439. 
174. See also Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncenainty, and the Transfer 
of Property. 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984). 
175. JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 279-332 (2d ed. 1975); 
CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 11.9; Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of Land 
Title Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (1977); Joseph T. Janczyk, 
Land Title Systems, Scale of Operations, and Operating and Conversion Costs, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
569, 570-72 (1979). 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74. 
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in the land. From the perspective of ex ante efficiency and retributive 
justice considerations, only the former recordation should matter. 
Moreover, even though the pure race recording statutes grant pri-
ority to a second-in-time promisee who records his interest first, this 
priority is supposed to be granted even if the second-in-time promisee 
acts with full knowledge of the prior conflicting claim. In other 
words, pure race recording statutes apply ex ante efficiency and retrib-
utive justice considerations against first-in-time promisees, while they 
ignore the relevance of such considerations to the conduct of second-
in-time promisees. 
The only way to rationalize this difference in treatment of first-in-
time and second-in-time promisees under pure race statutes is by view-
ing such statutes as extreme manifestations of the typical situations 
approach to the structure of priority rules.177 Pure race recording 
statutes resolve conflicting transaction cases on the basis of a techni-
cal, objective factor (time of recordation), making it unnecessary to 
probe into the unique facts of particular cases. This approach seems 
particularly justified the more certain one is in assuming that only 
rarely would a second-in-time party become aware of the existence of a 
prior unrecorded interest. Indeed, it is for these reasons that article 9 
of the UCC has adopted a pure race priority rule under which "prior-
ity between conflicting security interests in the same collateral" is de-
termined "in the order of filing."178 
b. Notice recording statutes. About half of the states have adopted 
notice statutes that follow the two traditional common law rules of 
"first in time first in right" and GFPV. Yet as I have argued earlier,179 
these two rules fit well into a title system in which rights in land are 
not supposed to be recorded; they seem misplaced, though, in a system 
in which records are maintained.180 
c. Notice-race recording statutes. About another half of the states 
have adopted notice-race recording statutes. These, in turn, grant pri-
ority to the second-in-time promisee only if he has both attained the 
status of GFPV and recorded his conveyance. These statutes are 
based on a strange mixture of ex ante efficiency considerations and 
retributive justice considerations, on one hand, and ex post efficiency 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
178. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1990). See David G. Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1986); see also RICH-
ARD LEMP.CRT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INvrrATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIE.NCB 27-30, 89· 
132 (1986) (discussing the movement in the law from negligence rule logics to strict liability rule 
logics). 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74. 
180. See also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 149, at 807. 
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and need considerations, on the other. For the second-in-time prom-
isee to prevail, he should be a GFPV in the traditional sense, i.e., the 
greater loss bearer.181 But under notice-race statutes, if the second-in-
time party, even though a GFPV, fails to record his interest, he will 
lose out to the superior interest of the first-in-time promisee. Yet no 
equivalent requirement of recording as a precondition to priority is 
imposed on the first-in-time promisee: he is supposed to prevail in 
spite of his failure to record his claim in the first place (which failure 
has generated the conflict), and, needless to say, even if he is not a 
GFPV. 
3. Conflicting Assignments 
a. The Code's approack Article 9's approach to the problem of 
conflicting assignments182 assumes that the first-in-time assignee en-
joys an ability to prevent the occurrence of the conflict by filing a fi-
nancing statement, alerting potential future assignees of the prior 
assignment. In adopting a pure race priority rule, 183 article 9's ap-
proach manifests ex ante efficiency considerations and considerations 
of retributive justice against first-in-time assignees who fail to record 
their assignments. 
b. The Restatement rule. In contrast, the Restatement rule184 as-
sumes that ex ante efficiency considerations and considerations of re-
tributive justice are irrelevant for resolving cases of conflicting 
assignments. Under the Restatement, the traditional pair of "first in 
time first in right" and GFPV rules govern the conflict. This ex post 
efficiency/need approach is justified given that, unlike article 9 of the 
UCC, the Restatement does not envisage the existence of a filing sys-
tem in which assignees are able to record their rights: Rather, the 
Restatement assumes that the first-in-time assignee is unable to alert 
subsequent potential assignees of his right.185 
c. The English rule. The English rule186 represents a n,Jxture of ex 
ante efficiency and retributive justice considerations, on one hand, and 
ex post efficiency and need considerations, on the other: in condition-
ing the priority of an assignee on her notifying the obligor of the as-
signment, it represents the former perspective;187 in conditioning the 
181. See also supra text accompanying notes 77-91. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 158-61. 
183. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1990). 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55. 
185. The Restatement rule is the equivalent of notice recording statutes of land transactions. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57. 
187. A person who is buying or lending money on the security of a debt •.. is well advised 
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priority of an assignee on her qualification as a GFPV, it represents 
the latter. The mixture of both perspectives seems unjustifiable. 
Moreover, while the notification requirement is appropriate for spo-
radic, small-scale assignment transactions, it obviously is unsuitable 
for large-scale financial transactions for the assignment of accounts. 188 
d. The New York rule. Finally, the New York rule189 is a strict 
doctrinal application of the nemo dat rule. From a doctrinal perspec-
tive, title in an assigned right may be transferred from the assignor to 
the assignee upon the formation of the assignment contract. All the 
above approaches, however, assume that, even though the assignor B 
has been divested as a result of the first assignment of any title in the 
assigned right, the assignor is left with the power to transfer such title 
to a subsequent assignee C who meets certain requirements. Under 
the New York rule, however, after the first assignment the assignor is 
deemed to be left neither with title in the assigned right, nor with any 
power with respect to it. Therefore, the New York rule cannot be 
rationalized under either ex ante/retributivist considerations, or ex 
post/need considerations. Rather, it is an extreme manifestation of 
the nemo dat rule. 
VI. SELLER-TRANSFEREE CONFLICTS 
A. The Seller's Right To Specific Restitution and the Claims of 
Third Party Transferees 
A sells and delivers an asset to B. B materially breaches the con-
tract by failing to pay the price due to A. A cancels her contract with 
B and demands restitution of the asset. Prior to A's cancellation, or 
afterwards, B sells the asset, or a right in the asset, to C. A priority 
rule is needed to determine which of the two competing parties is enti-
tled to her rights in the asset. 
An injured seller is sometimes entitled to the remedy of specific 
restitution in case of material breach by the buyer.190 In those cases, 
the buyer B is deemed to have acquired voidable title in the asset sold 
under the contract and if the buyer transfers the asset to a subsequent 
to apply first to the debtor ..• to see if it has already been assigned ••• at the same time 
warning [the debtor] of the forthcoming assignment to him. Thus [under the English rule] 
the debtor •.. keep[s], as it were, a private register of assignments. 
F.H. LAWSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 56 (1958). 
188. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 25.6. The English rule is the equivalent of notice-race stat-
utes of land transactions. 
189. See supra text accompanying note 153. 
190. E. ALLAN FARNSWORrn, CoNTRAcrs § 12.19, at 948 (2d ed. 1990) ("Although Spe· 
cific restitution is often available to a party that has a claim to restitution as a remedy for breach, 
courts do not grant it routinely, as they would in cases of avoidance."). 
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buyer C: that buyer would need to qualify as a GFPV in order to 
prevail over the claim of the original seller A. 191 In some cases, how-
ever, the courts would not furnish the seller with the remedy of spe-
cific restitution. Rather, A would be limited to a claim for the price 
and B's title would be classified as valid title.192 This is particularly 
true in the case of contracts for the sale of fungible goods. 
Under pre-Code law, a distinction evolved between cash sale trans-
actions for the sale of goods and credit sale transactions. In the case of 
cash sale transactions, title in the goods was deemed to be continu-
ously held by A until actual payment by B, and B's title was classified 
as void title. 193 In the case of credit sale transactions, B was deemed 
to have acquired voidable title in the goods.194 Therefore, under the 
nemo dat rule, after a cash sale transaction, following a default by B, 
no subsequent buyer C could acquire rights in the goods.195 In con-
trast, in the case of a credit sale transaction, C could acquire valid title 
in the goods by qualifying as a GFPV.196 
The UCC preserves the distinction between cash sale and credit 
sale transactions yet it accords it a new content. In the case of cash 
sale transactions, B does not have any right in the goods as against his 
seller until payment of the price.197 Yet for the purpose of transac-
tions between B and C, B is deemed to have voidable title in the goods 
so that he can transfer valid title to a GFPV transferee.198 
In the case of credit sale transactions, 199 the Code's general rule is 
that B acquires valid title in the goods, regardless of whether he pays 
or does not pay the price, so that A is not entitled to any remedy with 
respect to the goods. Rather, A may recover the price from his debtor, 
B. Therefore, under the shelter rule, C may acquire valid title in the 
goods even without qualifying as GFPV. Yet if B has received the 
goods while insolvent, A may reclaim the goods from the buyer, Le., A 
191. DOBBS, supra note 103, § 4.4, at 257-58, § 4.7, at 281-83, 285; Ames, supra note 92, at 
11; Henry W. Ballantine, Purchase for Value and Estoppel, 6 MINN. L. REv. 87, 90-91 (1922). 
192. DOBBS, supra note 103, § 4.4, at 257. 
193. Gilmore, supra note 124, at 1060-62; Smith, supra note 75, at 43-44; Weinberg, supra 
note 92, at 15-32; Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy 
Anomaly, 62 YALE L.J. 101, 101-02 (1952); Note, supra note 124, at 527-28. 
194. Gilmore, supra note 124, at 1060-62; Smith, supra note 75, at 44-45; Weinberg, supra 
note 92, at 15-32; Note, supra note 124, at 533. 
195. See sources cited supra note 193. 
196. See sources cited supra note 194. 
197. u.c.c. § 2-507(2) (1990). 
198. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(c) (1990); see also U.C.C. §§ 2A-304(1){c), 2A-305(1)(b) (1990). 
199. "Where the instrument offered by the buyer is not a payment but a credit instrument 
such as a note or a check post-dated by even one day, the seller's acceptance of the instrument 
insofar as third parties are concerned, amounts to a delivery on credit ..•• " U.C.C. § 2-511 cmt. 
6 (1990). 
148 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:95 
may have a remedy directed not only against his buyer but also against 
the goods.200 If B transfers the goods to a GFPV, however, that trans-
feree may cut off the seller's power of reclamation.201 
B. Ex Ante Efficiency Considerations and Considerations of 
Retributive Justice 
Any credit transaction involves certain risks that are avoidable in 
cash transactions. Sellers who extend credit to their buyers usually 
resort to some procedure for determining the creditworthiness of their 
buyers (from the making of a casual and superficial assessment up to 
obtaining a report from a credit rating agency such as Dun and Brad-
street). In some cases, following this determination, these sellers will 
take specific measures to protect their interests (such as structuring 
the transaction as a cash transaction or insisting upon a security inter-
est, a guarantee, or a letter of credit). In most cases, if the credit buyer 
has defaulted, the seller could have done better. The buyer's default is 
usually the seller's failure as much as it is the buyer's. We may say, 
therefore, that in the case of triangle conflicts that result from material 
breach, considerations of ex ante efficiency and retributive justice mili-
tate against the original seller. In most cases, some fault of the origi-
nal seller has enabled the intermediate wrongdoer to take possession of 
the asset while subsequently failing to pay its price. This means that, 
as between a subsequent buyer of the disputed asset and the original 
seller, any loss resulting from the conflict should be assigned to the 
seller. 
From the perspective of the foregoing analysis, it seems that it 
would be unjustified to apply the traditional GFPV concept to triangle 
conflicts resulting from breach of contract. The traditional concept, 
with its stringent requirements of actual value and title, allocates 
losses to second-in-time parties and is appropriate for conflicts gov-
erned by ex post efficiency and need considerations.202 The Code's 
GFPV concept, premised on ex ante efficiency considerations and re-
tributive justice considerations,203 is more appropriate to triangle con-
flicts resulting from material breach. 
We have seen that with regard to conflicts over goods, the Code, 
following the common law, maintains a distinction between cash sale 
and credit sale transactions. Apparently, this distinction is based on 
200. u.c.c. § 2-702(2) (1990). 
201. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1990); see also U.C.C. §§ 2A-304(1)(b), 2A-30S(l)(b) (1990). 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49, 89-91. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 93-108. 
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the presumed intentions of the original seller and her buyer as to the 
allocation of rights and risks between them. In cash sale transactions, 
the seller does not intend to pass title to the buyer prior to actual 
payment, while in credit sale transactions the seller agrees to relfu-
quish any claim to the goods following their delivery to the buyer. (As 
we have seen, the common law interprets the intentions of parties to 
such transactions somewhat differently.) Yet the focus of this distinc-
tion on title simply underlines the flaws of the doctrinal-derivational 
approach set forth earlier.204 While in the context of the transaction 
of the original seller and her buyer the distinction may make sense, it 
is totally meritless within the context of a conflict between the original 
seller and a subsequent buyer. From the perspective of the efficiency 
and justice considerations relevant to such conflicts, it is immaterial 
whether A and B have meant to enter a cash or credit sale transaction, 
and the same allocation of entitlements and losses should take place 
between the two competing parties, A and C: in both cases. 
C. Ex Post Efficiency Considerations and Need Considerations 
In triangle conflicts resulting from material breach the original 
seller is likely to suffer a loss amounting to the full contract price 
which, presumably, approximates the market value of the disputed as-
set. (Otherwise, there would arise no conflict. Only in cases in which 
the seller is likely to suffer a loss to the extent of at least a substantial 
amount of the price of the asset will he be entitled to cancel his con-
tract and reclaim the asset.) The original seller is not likely, however, 
to suffer a personal value loss. Whether the asset had been used by the 
seller as fungible property or as personal property, the asset's price 
would presumably approximate its market value, and the seller's 
agreement to part with it implies that her loss would not exceed that 
value. Because the requirements of possession and title serve as equal-
izers for personal value losses,205 even if one prefers to approach con-
filcts resulting from material breach by applying ex post efficiency and 
need considerations, it would still be superfluous to condition the pri-
ority of the subsequent buyer on his taking possession of the asset or 
on his acquiring title in it. 
VII. THEFr 
A. The Nemo Dat Rule and the Market Overt Rule 
A is the owner of certain goods. B steals A's goods and sells them 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11. 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91. 
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to C. A demands reclamation of the goods from C. A priority rule 
must determine which of the two competing parties is entitled to title 
in the goods. 206 
Clearly, in theft-related conflicts, under the nemo dat rule, as B 
receives no title from A, B can transfer none to C: so that A should 
prevail. In England, however, an exception to this rule is recognized: 
C may cut off A ,s title in goods purchased by C in good faith in a 
market overt.207 The market overt rule was discussed in several states 
of the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century, but it 
was rejected.208 Thus, under American law, if an owner loses posses-
sion of goods through theft, the owner may follow the goods and re-
claim them from any subsequent transferee. 
The English rule puts the risk of theft on the party who has 
purchased the goods from the thief, except for cases in which the other 
competing party is a market overt purchaser, in which case the Eng-
lish rule puts the risk on the original owner of the goods. 209 American 
law always puts the risk of theft on the party who has transacted with 
the thief: any subsequent transferee would lose to the owner but 
would be able to sue his immediate seller.210 Apparently, the only 
party who would not be able to sue his immediate seller is the pur-
chaser from the thief. Thus, in evaluating the American approach to 
theft conflicts we have to focus on the conduct and interests of the 
original owner, on one hand, and the party who purchased the goods 
from the thief, on the other. 
206. Marcel Mauss cites a story of the Indian Mahabharata under which 
Nrga, the king of the Yadus, was changed into a lizard, through the sin of his own people, 
for having given a cow to a Brahmin that belonged to another Brahmin. He who had ac-
cepted it in good faith did not want to give it back, not even in exchange for a 100,000 
others .••. Nor will the one from whom the cow has been removed accept another. It is 
irrevocably the property of both Brahmins. Faced with the two refusals, the unfortunate 
king remains under a spell for thousands of years because of the curse that the property 
carried with it. 
MAuss, supra note 97, at 57-58. 
207. LAW REFORM CoMM., 'fwELFfH REPORT, TRANSFER OF Tm.E TO CHATTELS,§§ 30-
35, reprinted in HONNOLD, supra note 9, at 412, 416-18; LAWSON, supra note 187, at 37; TYLER 
& PALMER, supra note 157, at 174-75, 202-07; Durfee, supra note 3, at 693; Weinberg, supra note 
92, at 3-15. 
208. Merrill v. Dietz (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 62 B.R. 118 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1986), modified sub nom., Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 D.R. 
843 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987); Bay Springs Forest Prods., Inc. v. Wade, 435 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 
1978); Pate v. Elliott, 400 N.E.2d 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Durfee, supra note 3, at 693; War-
ren, supra note 75, at 470; Weinberg, supra note 15, at 569-70; Weinberg, supra note 92, at 3-15. 
For a review of the attitudes of various legal systems, see Levmore, supra note 172. 
209. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 583-85. 
210. Id. at 569, 574 n.25. 
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B. Ex Ante Efficiency Considerations and Retributive 
Justice Considerations 
151 
At first sight, it seems difficult to tell whether owners or purchasers 
of goods who transact with thieves have the greater ability to prevent 
theft conflicts. The difficulty arises not because members of these two 
categories of competing parties cannot be presumed, to have a mean-
ingful ability to prevent the conflict but, on the contrary, because 
members of both categories of competing parties can prevent it. 
The case for viewing the owner as a party able to prevent the theft 
of his goods is clear: the owner physically controls his goods. 211 The 
owner is aware of the value of his goods; the owner is also presumed to 
be aware of the frequency of theft in his neighborhood, office, plant, 
and so on. Thus, the owner may be expected to be able to take cost-
effective measures for preventing theft of his goods. 2 12 
On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that transactions for 
the sale of goods by thieves are usually conducted in circumstances 
that should excite suspicion in the mind of the purchaser. Therefore, 
one can assume that, generally, purchasers from thieves are in a posi-
tion enabling them to prevent the conflict. Indeed, in cases in which 
the purchaser acts with actual knowledge or presumed suspicion of the 
theft, ex ante efficiency considerations and considerations of retribu-
tive justice dictate that she be denied priority.213 Assuming, however, 
that the purchaser does not act with actual knowledge or presumed 
suspicion of the theft, can she take any meaningful precautionary 
measures for detecting the theft? I think the answer should clearly be 
in the negative.214 This implies, therefore, that from the perspective of 
ex ante efficiency and retributive justice considerations, owners of sto-
len goods should lose their interest in the goods to purchasers of these 
goods who have directly transacted with the thief in good faith and to 
any subsequent purchaser of the goods who derives her title from such 
a person. From this perspective, it is hard to justify the American 
priority rule that governs theft conflicts. 
C. Ex Post Efficiency Considerations and Need Considerations 
It is also hard to justify the American rule from the perspectives of 
ex post efficiency and need considerations. Clearly, at first sight, it 
211. Cf. the risk of loss doctrine, U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 2-510 (1990). 
212. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 583, 585-86; Jillison, supra note 124, at 515-19; see also 
SCHWARTZ & SCOTI, supra note 5, at 508-12; cf. u.c.c. §§ 3-405, 3-406 (1990). 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80. 
214. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 584-85; Jillison, supra note 124, at 515-19; see also Jackson, 
supra note 5, at 47-50. 
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would be plausible to view original owners of stolen goods as the 
"greater loss bearers": because the disputed goods have been taken 
from their owners against their will, these owners may suffer a loss to 
the extent of the market value of the goods, if they regarded them as 
fungible property goods, and, additionally, a personal element of loss, 
if they regarded the goods as personal property. 
In one case, however, we would be justified in assuming that the 
losses likely to be suffered by the purchaser if the original owner 
prevails would be equal to or even greater than the losses likely to be 
suffered by the owner if'. the purchaser prevails: this is the case in 
which the purchaser has fully paid the price for the goods and, even 
more so, in cases in which the purchaser has himself used the goods 
for some time as personal property. Clearly, in those cases, we would 
not minimize the losses suffered by parties involved in triangle con-
flicts if we were to take the stolen goods away from their current own-
ers and return them to their previous owners. Yet even in these 
circumstances, American law grants priority to the original owner. 
Thus, the American priority rule for conflicts of theft can be rational-
ized neither through ex ante efficiency and retributive justice consider-
ations nor through ex post efficiency considerations and need 
considerations of justice. Rather, much like the New York rule that 
governs cases of conflicting assignments,215 the American theft rule 
can be rationalized only within the framework of purely doctrinal con-
siderations: it is an extreme manifestation of the nemo dat rule.216 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I offered a normative framework for the resolution of 
triangle conflicts premised on both the concept of efficiency (the mini-
mization of the costs of preventing conflicts, the losses due to conflicts, 
and the costs of determining priorities in conflicts) and the concept of 
justice (justice as retribution and justice as the allocation of scarce 
resources to those who need them most). I argued that there is a con-
vergence between these efficiency and justice imperatives and that both 
dictate that in all cases of triangle conflict in which one of the two 
competing parties clearly could have prevented the occurrence of the 
conflict, priority should be granted to the other party and that in all 
other cases, priority should be granted to the competing party likely to 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 189. 
216. The difference in the approaches of the law to entrustment conflicts, see supra Part IV, 
and to theft conflicts is another manifestation of the fundamental distinction in the common law 
between cases of misfeasance and cases of nonfeasance. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 20, 
§ 18.6; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). 
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suffer the greater loss if he is denied priority and the other party 
prevails. 
Attempting to rationalize the GFPV doctrine in light of the fore-
going normative premises, I argued that the element of good faith in 
the traditional GFPV doctrine represents both the ex ante efficiency 
policy of allocating entitlements against parties who can prevent the 
occurrence of conflicts and the imperatives of the retributive justice 
concept. I also argued that the elements of value and acquisition of 
title that are part of the traditional GFPV doctrine represent both the 
ex post efficiency policy of allocating entitlements to parties likely to 
suffer the greater loss and the imperatives of the need criterion of the 
distributive justice concept. 
Discussing the UCC concepts of GFPV and BOCB, I argued that 
they are appropriate for resolving triangle conflicts with regard to 
which ex ante efficiency considerations and retributive justice consid-
erations dictate that losses be borne by the first-in-time parties in-
volved in the conflicts. Analyzing some of the conflicts governed by 
the Code (entrustment, seller in possession, seller-transferee), I 
showed that, indeed, it is justified to allocate the losses resulting from 
them to the first-in-time parties. I also showed that it would be super-
fluous to apply the requirements of possession and acquisition of title 
as part of the Code's concepts of GFPV and BOCB. 
In Private Property and the Constitution 217 Bruce Ackerman de-
fined two modes of discourse about the law: the intuitionist method of 
the Ordinary Observer, traditionally employed by judges in resolving 
legal issues, and the method of the Scientific Policymaker (most com-
monly consisting of Utilitarianism and Kantianism), which has arisen 
in American law in recent decades. Ackerman argued that, at least 
within the specific context of the "taking problem," these two methods 
would often resolve legal issues differently. In this article I argued 
that in resolving triangle conflicts judges have been motivated by their 
intuitions of justice and that as there is a convergence between these 
intuitions and the imperatives of the efficiency concept, our priority 
law may be rationalized to a substantial extent in terms of the effi-
ciency concept. This, in tum, led to the more general argument that 
the above convergence lies at the root of the considerable explanatory 
217. ACKERMAN, supra note 36, at 1-22; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING 
AMERICAN LAW (1983); Soper, supra note 36. In Moral Thinking, R.M. Hare makes a distinc· 
tion similar to the one made by Ackerman. Hare suggests that there are two methods for resolv-
ing moral issues: "critical thinking'' and "intuitive thinking." HARE, supra note 36. In Utility 
and Rights, Hare argues that many conclusions that would be intuitively reached by most people 
would also be justifiable by adopting the critical method of thinking. R.M. HARE, Rights, Utility, 
and Universalization: Reply to J.L. Mackie, in UTILITY AND RIGHIS, supra note 36, at 118-19. 
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power of the efficiency criterion when applied to a substantial amount 
of common law doctrine. 
"[A]ll law is universal,,, said Aristotle, "but about some things it is 
not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct." 
This article touches on a fundamental jurisprudential problem: the 
gap between legal rules, on one hand, and the richness of the reality 
governed by these rules, on the other. Many triangle conflicts, each 
presenting its own unique equities, arise in numerous legal contexts. 
Our law, however, regulates many of these diverse situations by em-
ploying a single legal doctrine, the traditional GFPV doctrine (or one 
of its variants, such as the holder in due course doctrine and the 
Code's GFPV and BOCB doctrines). Moreover, these doctrines at-
tempt to resolve conflicts not by weighing the equities of the particular 
competing parties involved, but by setting forth a limited number of 
typical factual situations and inquiring whether a particular case of 
conflict falls into one of them. 
This article has offered a normative framework comprised of con-
siderations of efficiency and justice for resolving triangle conflicts. 
While I believe that these considerations are relevant for resolving the 
many conflicts not discussed in this article (for example, conflicts aris-
ing within the context of article 9 of the UCC, or conflicts over negoti-
able instruments), it remains for future studies to explore the extent to 
which the rules governing these conflicts may be rationalized in terms 
of the considerations of efficiency and justice offered in this article. 
